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SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
M. C. EULETTE
T HE fact that the Constitution of the United States was
crystallized into words and adopted in written form, has
had a significant influence upon the evolution and develop-
ment of the law in this country.' A greater flexibility and a
more facile adaptability to a progressively changing civili-
zation might derive from an unwritten corpus of constitu-
tional law.2 It was a daring and dangerous act for the
founding fathers, fifteen decades ago, to formulate into
words the pattern for this nation's political, economic and
social structure and future development. By that act, they
cast the die by which, had they been imbued with less
I Dimock, Modern Politics and Administration (American Book Company,
Chicago, 1937) 168: "In a system which assumes that a written constitution Is
supreme, the separation-of-powers doctrine takes on a significance not found in
countries where legislative finality is definitely established. In constitutional
theory, all three departments in the United States are equal and independent.
Each operates in its own bailiwick. The Constitution coalesces their work."
2 Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New
York, 1938) 316: "From the semantic point of view, we cannot expect the meaning
of written constitutions to survive extensive changes in culture. Unless the words
are given new concepts in the light of new conditions, they will be used blindly.
rigidly, and will weaken the power of governments to govern. This is one reason
why the unwritten British constitution provides a more flexible and practical
instrument than the American." But see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "The Disorderly
Conduct of Words," 41 Col. L. Rev. 381 at 403: ". . . it is not correct to say, with
Stuart Chase, that 'we cannot expect the meaning of written constitutions to
survive extensive changes in culture.' Of course a clause acquires new significa-
tions as external conditions alter and many cases are decided. It becomes
applicable to more tangible objects or to fewer. It grows like a human being,
or like a university, which has a continuous life although older professors and
students are gradually replaced by younger men."
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vision,' the future legal relations, rights and duties of the
people of the United States might have been rigidly molded
to conform to primitive regulations, every vestige of the
practical utility of which had long since disappeared.4 By
that act, also, they restricted the means for legal recogni-
tion and acceptance of the fact that, by cultural and indus-
trial progress, verbal symbols and their meaning continu-
ally shift. Judicial construction of particular words was,
and is, the only method of reflecting and adequately coping
with the changing context of the situation.5 Only through
the exercise of discretion could judges prevent that drastic
distortion of justice which would result if a rigid interpreta-
tion of the words and symbols of the Constitution were alone
applied to the complexities of the modern, commercial
world.'
Inspired, as they might not otherwise have been, by the
s Chase, op. cit. 314: "The Constitution as conceived by its framers was no
narrow bill of particulars, but a broad instrument to give the newly created
Federal Government power to deal with a serious crisis, and to lead the nation
forward along mercantilist lines. The founders wrote no intricate body of rules,
no involved code, no inflexible corpus of constitutional law."
4 E. Parmalee Prentice, "Congress, and the Regulation of Corporations," 19
Harv. L. Rev. 168 at 169 (1905): "Unfortunately there seems to be a growing .. .
belief that the Constitution is not in all respects adequate to existing conditions,
and that new powers should be assumed by and supported in the federal govern-
ment. The statement of this proposition is probably its best answer, for there
is no general desire to question the supremacy of the Constitution, either directly
or by constructions which are recognized as unsound." See also Arthur W. Machen,
Jr., "The Elasticity of the Constitution," 14 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1900), and
Dimock, op. cit. 161: "To some people, a written constitution suggests the idea
of something finished. It symbolizes the truth revealed at a given time and
place and remaining all-sufficient for an indefinite period thereafter . . .Govern-
ment is a response to social needs which change with invention and human
contrivance."
5 Dimock, op. cit. 165: "Constitutions are not self-executing or self-interpreting.
Irrespective of whether or not there may be a transcendental law, substantive
law requires instrumentation. This means that ultimately some person or agency
must be supreme . . . When citizens disagree and interfere with the work and
peace of society, public authority steps in and adjusts the controversy. Likewise,
the departments of government sometimes disagree as to the interpretation of
the Constitution. Some one of them, therefore, must have the power to decide.
In Great Britain, Parliament is the agency which decides; the legislature is
supreme. In the United States the highest court of each governmental jurisdiction
decides; the judiciary is supreme. The Constitution is what those who interpret
it say it is."
6 Dimock, op. cit. 162: "... not the least part of the change due to construc-
tion has been by 'judicial legislation.' The application of old rules to new cases
gradually changes the law. This process is most pronounced in the field of con-
stitutional law, where rules are not so complete and where dynamic forces
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responsibility thus placed upon them by a written constitu-
tion, the members of the judiciary have consistently and wise-
ly divested that instrument of any cloak of false sanc-
tity.7 Realistically they have searched for the essential
"meaning" and connotation of the words as they were used
by the founders, in the light of their historical context.8 The
compelling principle which they have invariably discovered
is a standard of reasonableness, 9 which, when employed as
a guide, leads toward the fairest and most equitable resolu-
tion of legal difficulties. This standard they have used in the
dissemination of justice to the litigants before them, interpret-
ing "the law" and the Constitution in the light of current
concepts, current mores, and current business methods.1"
Nowhere is this procedure more vividly illustrated than
in the decisions involving "due process.'"" For example,
impinge most sharply. Judges engage in policy formation as well as in its
enforcement."
7 Louis Prashker, "Service of Summons on Non-Resident Natural Persons Doing
Business in New York," 15 St. John's L. Rev. 1 at 20 (1940): "Jurisdictional
concepts are not sacrosanct. They are subject to the give-and-take of the progres-
sive development of societal relations."
8 Chafee, Jr., op. cit. 402: "Here again the problem is far less simple than
these writers make out. No doubt we are forced to broaden our conception of
the 'meaning' of a word, when we are dealing with language which is applied
many years after it was originally written. Those who used the word knew of
definite persons or things which fell within its terms. Many of these tangible
realities have long since disappeared. Others have come into existence of which
the writers never thought."
9 Jay Leo Rothschild, "Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations in Personam,"
17 Va. L. Rev. 129 (1930). Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. (2d) 139 (1930).
10 Roger S. Foster, "Place of Trial in Civil Actions," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217
(1930), and note in 28 Calif. L. Rev. 227 (1940).
11 Dimock, op. cit. 181-2: "The due-process provisions are the most important
ones in the federal Constitution. They have made the judiciary a policy-making
agency of enormous influence. They have made judicial supremacy the most
important constitutional principle. They have radically changed the Constitution
of 1789 . . . Today the highest court's leading cases deal with economic and
social questions, as a direct consequence of the importance which has been
given these two provisions, neither of which was in the original Constitution."
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, Mass., 1927, 8th Ed.) II, 741: "Due process of law in each particular
case means, such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims
of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of indi-
vidual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in
question belongs." See also Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co., 106 Wis.
396, 82 N.W. 308, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41, 50 L. R. A. 577 (1900); Moyer v. Bucks,
2 Ind. App. 571, 28 N.E. 992, 16 L. R. A. 231 (1891); Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511,
129 N.W. 494, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 292 (1911); Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397.
161 N.W. 148, L. R. A. 1917C 1140 (1917); People v. O'Brien, 111 N.Y. 1, 18 N.E. 692,
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when, in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution, the founders used the word "person" they un-
doubtedly meant a "natural" or human individual such as
"John Jones." He and his wife and children were to be
guaranteed "due process. "12 In determining in the nine-
teenth century the extent to which the eighteenth century
denotation of "person" might be expanded, the court looked
back into history, first to ascertain the "objects" to which
that word "person" probably referred in 1789 when the Bill
of Rights was adopted, and second, to determine whether
or not it was then contemplated that to such word should in-
ure a long continued application." Finding that such "ob-
ject" was the human individual and being satisfied that
such continued application was contemplated, the court
looked out upon the then contemporary world and deter-
mined that, with the advent of the industrial era, the word
"person" had acquired a new content. 4 Acts were being
performed and obligations were being incurred by,
and rights were being granted to groups, organizations and
"creatures" other than human individuals. 5 Among these
other bodies were corporations, state-created entities, the
numerical ascendancy of which was becoming increasingly
apparent." The courts- were importuned to adjust the
2 L. R. A. 255 (1888); Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474, 2 L. R. A. 655
(1889); Re Gannon, 16 R. I. 537, 18 A. 159, 5 L. R. A. 359 (1889); Ulman v. Balti-
more, 72 Md. 587, 20 A. 141, 11 L. R. A. 224 (1890); Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N.Y.
190, 28 N.E. 1040, 13 L. R. A. 304 (1891); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 24
L. Ed. 436 (1877).
12 See note 18 post.
Is Chafee, Jr., op. cit. 403-4: "The problem of long-enduring words extends far
beyond constitutions. Even if courts could disregard constitutional phrases limit-
ing the national government at the risk of disrupting the federal system, they
would not be equally free to reject the responsibility of interpreting words in old
statutes . . . and old contracts and deeds . . . Nor is it always sufficient to
determine what objects the words were applied to at the time they were written.
. . . When those who used words contemplated their long continued application,
these words must eventually acquire a new content..."
14 Chafee, Jr., op. cit. 387: ". . . words are very imperfect means of com-
munication. A word doesn't stay put. It wabbles and slides around." See also
Powell, "The Changing Law of Foreign Corporations," 33 Poli. Sci. Q. 549 (1918).
15 Elliott E. Cheatham, et al, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws (The
Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1941), 1103.
16 Hugh Evander Willis. Constitutional Law of the United States (The Principia
Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1936), 858: "Enough figures have been given to show
how completely our economic life has become dominated by corporations. Cor-
porations have now gathered property under their system. Corporations control
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legal relations of corporations, whose representatives urged
that such relations were protected by the constitutional
safeguards contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. As early as 1838, it was held that the property and
franchises of an incorporated university were property en-
titled to the same protection under the "due process" clause
as property of human individuals. 17
Since, by judicial construction, a corporation is now con-
ceded to be a "person" for purposes of protection under
the "due process" clauses of the Constitution, the manner
of affording such protection is the next paramount concern.
The consideration here devoted to this issue is strictly limit-
ed to the constitutional limitations required by the "due
the production and the distribution of products and almost all other aspects of
our economic life, so that our civilization has in a real sense become a corporate
civilization."
17 Regents of University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72
(1838). Among the early cases holding that a corporation is a "person" within the
meaning of the due process clause are: Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142
U. S. 386, 12 S. Ct. 255, 35 L. Ed. 1051 (1892); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898); Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722 (1882); County
of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 F. 385 (1883); Wheeling Bridge and
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 658 (1894). In the same era there
were, surprisingly, rare cases holding to the contrary: State v. Brown & Sharpe
Mfg. Co., 18 R. I. 16, 25 A. 246 (1892); Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes,
27 S. C. 385, 4 S. E. 49 (1887). For a criticism of the doctrine, see Chase, op. cit.
22: "Judges and lawyers furthermore have granted to a legal abstraction the
rights, privileges, and protection vouchsafed to a living, breathing human being.
It is thus corporations, as well as you or I, are entitled to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. It would surely be a rollicking sight to see the Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey in pursuit of happiness at a dance hall. It would be
a sight to see United States Smelting and Refining being brought back to con-
sciousness by a squad of coastguardsmen armed with a respirator, to see the
Atlas Corporation enjoying its constitutional freedom at a nudist camp. This gross
animism has permitted a relatively small number of individuals to throw the
economic mechanism seriously out of gear." Compare with Bryant Smith, "Legal
Personality," 37 Yale L. J. 283 (1928), Charles Sumner Lobingier, "The Natural
History of the Private Artificial Person: A Comparative Study in Corporate
Origins," 13 Tulane L. Rev. 41 (1938), and Rodney L. Mott, Due Process of Law
(The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, Ind., 1926) 419: "It was because the
corporation was merely a device for the representation of the interests of
individuals, that the court was able to look back of the artificial person to the
shareholders who composed it. To deprive the corporation of property would, in
reality, deprive the stockholders of the property. Consequently, if due process of
law had any value, it must protect corporations as well as individuals . ...
The application of these principles has resulted in holding that corporations are
entitled to "equal protection," Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S.
389, 48 S. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927 (1928), but has not been extended to hold that the
corporation is such a "citizen" as to fall within the operation of the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908).
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process" clause as it relates to the service of process in
suits against private corporations not incorporated in a
state in which the suit is instituted. This necessarily
includes a discussion of the bases relied upon by the courts
as a justification for assuming jurisdiction over such a for-
eign corporation, 18 as well as the manner in which the for-
eign corporation may be brought within the effective oper-
ation of the power implicit in the ability to exercise such
jurisdiction, 9 and some of the collateral elements which
influence the courts in their decisions, including the place
where the cause of action arose, the influence of the com-
merce clause, and the effect of non-compliance with vari-
ous statutes. It is not proposed to discuss fully the exact re-
quirements of "due process,"20 nor to compass the element
essential to procedural "due process" comprising a reason-
ably fair and impartial hearing,2' nor even to touch upon
any part of the field of exclusively substantive "due pro-
18 In Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0. R. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S. E. 101, 30 A. L. R.
248 (1923), the appellant cited the following cases for the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution covers the question whether
the courts of a state have acquired personal jurisdiction of a foreign corporation,
to-wit: Chipman v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed.
314 (1920); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878); St. Louis S. W. R.
Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486, Ann. Cas. 1915B 77
(1913); Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct." 280', 61
L. Ed. 710 (1917); Meisukas v. Greenough Red Ash Coal Co., 244 U. S. 54, 37
S. Ct. 593, 61 L. Ed. 987 (1917); People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587 (1918); Old Wayne Mut. L. Asso. v.
McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v. Southern R.
Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492 (1915).
19 Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co., 106 Wis. 396, 82 N.W. 308, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 41, 50 L. R. A. 577 (1900); Steele v. Western Union Tel. Co., 206 N. C. 220,
173 S. E. 583, 96 A. L. R. 361 (1934); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla.
539, 61 P. (2d) 184, 107 A. L. R. 858 (1936); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167, 128 A, L. R. 1437 (1939). In the
last mentioned case it was stated: "When the litigants are natural persons the
conceptions underlying venue present relatively few problems in application.
But in the case of corporate litigants these procedural problems are enmeshed
in the wider intricacies touching the status of a corporation in our law. The
corporate device is one form of associated enterprise, and what the law in effect
has done is to enforce rights and duties appropriate for collective activity (citing
cases). It has done so largely by assimilating corporations to natural persons. The
long, tortuous evolution of the methods whereby foreign corporations gained
access to courts or could be brought there, is the history of judicial groping
for a reconciliation between the practical position achieved by the corporation
in society and a natural desire to confine the powers of these artificial creations."
See also, note in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 135 (1940).
20 On this point see Cooley, op. cit. II, 740 et seq., and note 11 ante.
21 See Lasere v. Rochereau, 84 U. S. 437, 21 L. Ed. 694 (1873); Orchard v.
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cess." The following investigation will exclude as far as
possible discrimination between tort actions and suits based
on contract22 and between the types of action commonly
known as actions in rem, actions quasi-in-rem and actions
in personam but will treat only the latter, the former being
governed by well-established rules largely reflected in sta-
tutes which have received well-defined construction. 23 The
subject matter necessarily precludes by its definition a con-
sideration of questions relating to actions instituted by for-
eign corporations.24
The initial pertinent consideration revolves about the
question of whether or not under the circumstances the par-
ticular court has or may obtain jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation.25 The bases relied upon by the courts as a justi-
fication for assuming jurisdiction in any case are well-known
and limited in number. The roster usually includes such con-
cepts as domicile,26 citizenship or nationality, 27 presence,8
consent,29 appearance," and the doing of any act.31  The
Alexander, 157 U. S. 372, 15 S. Ct. 635, 39 L. Ed. 737 (1895); McVeigh v. United
States, 78 U. S. 259, 20 L. Ed. 80 (1871).
22 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922), and
cases cited therein.
23 Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional
Law (Cambridge, 1918), 78. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Private
Corporations (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, Ind., 1910, 2d Ed.) V, 1531-5.
24 On this point see 17 Bost. L. Rev. 639 (1937).
25 Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935); Thompson, op. cit. III,
927, and V, 1534, 1559; Willis, op. cit. 864. A note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 971
(1930) states: "The formula to be sought in each case is one which affords pro-
tection without molestation to the foreign corporation, and protection without
prejudice to the residents of states in which the corporation does business. The in-
cidents themselves have neither been definite nor constant. Such uncertainty is un-
desirable; social expediency is of itself too vague a guide for either the prede-
termination or adjudication of cases involving the nation's business and its pre-
eminent mechanism for the transaction of such business. It is probable, howe-
ever, that the next two decades will see the formulation into crystallized rules of
the principles governing the jurisdiction of the state over foreign corporations
doing business within its borders."
26 Raleigh C. Minor, Conflict of Laws; or, Private International Law (Little,
Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1901) 130; Herbert F. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(West Pub. Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1938, 2d Ed.) 155; W. S. Simkins, Simkins
Federal Practice (Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co., Rochester. N. Y., 1938, 3d Ed.)
82. 27 Goodrich, op. cit. 155.
28 Goodrich, op. cit. 155, and see notes 58-9 post.
29 Goodrich, op. cit. 155; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, 33 S. Ct.
550, 57 L. Ed. 867 (1913); and see notes 49 to 56, inclusive, post.
30 See case cited note 29, ante, and see also note 65 post.
81 Goodrich, op. cit. 155, and see notes 75 to 88, inclusive, post.
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peculiar nature of the corporation raises the question
of whether or not any of the foregoing customary bases
would be sufficiently relevant to endow the court with juris-
diction.32 Historically, the answer to this proposition was a
categorical negative.13 The so-called "territorial" or "restric-
tive" theory 4 upon which was found such negative reply
was a logical outgrowth of the commercial and industrial situ-
ation as it existed early in the history of this nation.35 How-
ever, the salient features of the civilization of that era have
long since been outmoded.36
At the height of the Civil War, President Lincoln, in an
32 Thompson, op. cit. V, 1537-8 and cases there cited; Henderson, op. cit. 164-9;
Joseph Henry Beale, "Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners," 26 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1913); William F. Cahill, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and
Individuals Who Carry on Business within the Territory," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 676
(1917); Bryant Smith, "Legal Personality," 37 Yale L. J. 283 (1928); Paul E.
Farrier, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 17 Minn. L. Rev. 270 (1933).
In addition see notes 17-8 and note 25, ante, and also see note 40 post.
33 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 10 L. Ed. 274 (1839).
34 A note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 957 (1931) states: "This geographical
theory of the nonexistence of a corporation in foreign states, known in inter-
national law as the restrictive theory because it tends to restrict and confine
corporations to the state of origin, has remained unshaken in our law for a
hundred years; even today courts declare that a corporation exists only within
the territorial limits of the state whose law gave it birth." See also John P.
Bullington, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 6 N. C. L. Rev. 147 (1927),
and notes in 40 Col. L. Rev. 1210 (1940) and 36 Yale L. J. 692 (1927). Textual
discussion may be found in Goodrich, op. cit. 173-9; George Wilfred Stumberg,
Principles of Conflict of Laws (The Foundation Press, Chicago, 1937) particularly
82, note 67; and Joseph C. France, Principles of Corporation Law (Baltimore,
Md., 1914, 2d Ed.) 347.
35 Willis, op. cit., 864, states: "This position was a twofold result of the doc-
trine of jurisdiction and of the concept of a corporation. The original Anglo-
American notion of jurisdiction was that of the physical power which the court
had, if need be, to lay the defendant by the heels. This required actual physical
presence. The original notion of -a corporation was that it was a metaphysical
entity and could have legal existence only within the state of its creation. Hence,
it could not be physically present in any other state so as to give such state
jurisdiction over it." See also Maxwell E. Fead, "Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations," 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1926), and Jay Leo Rothschild, "Jurisdiction
of Foreign Corporations in Personam," 17 Va. L. Rev. 129 (1930). The latter, at
144, states: "Fundamentally, all of the rules with respect to service of process
upon non-residents are steeped in the political and economi6 setting from which
they emerge; and it is to be expected, therefore, that that which was simple in
origin, when business conditions were less complex, should become difficult of
application when business conditions became more entangled."
36 In a note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 957 (1931) the author states: "While
courts have consistently confirmed the doctrine that a corporation, being a mere
creature of the law that clothed it with legal personality, has no existence where
its creative law is without effect, they have with equal unanimity sanctioned and
even protected its practical, if not theoretical, existence ouside the boundaries of
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address to Congress, said: "The dogmas of the quiet past
are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled
high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.
As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.
We must disenthrall ourselves. . . . 37 The expansion of
industrial activities made necessary the increased use of the
corporation as an instrumentality for extending the individu-
al's influence beyond the realm in which his physical activi-
ties could be carried on. The occasion was, indeed, "piled
high with difficulty." The courts thought anew and acted
anew and proceeded to "disenthrall" themselves from the
accustomed concept of corporations. The patent inequity of
permitting a corporation to engage in commerce within the
foreign state while being sheltered by an immunity to
suit, and of forcing an individual resident of one state who
acquired a grievance against a corporation doing business
within his state to travel to the state of its creation in order
to have redress demanded attention .3  The court recognized
that the quiet days of home industry, and the quiet ways
the state of origin. The explanation of the divergence here between fact and
theory is a century of economic and social progress; and the history of the law
of foreign corporations is a restatement of continued evasion and circumvention
through a fictional technique, of the traditional doctrine enunciated by Taney."
See also G. W. C. Ross, "The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction," 17 Minn. L. Rev. 146
(1933). The annotator in 23 L. R. A. 490 (1894), in commenting on Foster v. Charles
Betcher Lumber Co., 5 S. D. 57, 58 N.W. 9 (1894), states that the early doctrine
precluding the service of process upon a corporation outside the state of its
creation "was the cause of much inconvenience and often of manifest injustice.
The great increase in the number of corporations of late years, and the immense
extent of their business, only made this inconvenience and injustice more frequent
and marked . . . To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice, the
legislatures of several states interposed and provided for service of process on
officers and agents of foreign corporations doing business therein."
37 Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862. Nicolay & Hay, Complete
Works of Abraham Lincoln, VIII, 131.
38 In a note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 964 (1931) the author states: "With
the growth of extraterritorial corporate business came the inevitable problem of
whether a corporation could be subjected to suit in personam within a foreign
state. The early view denied such suability since by hypothesis the corporation
was absent from the foreign state and could not be served therein. But the
centralization of vast corporate interests in nonchartering states, and the in-
creased recognition and protection therein accorded foreign corporations rendered
intolerable their immunity from local suit." See also Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co.
of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E. 723, 45 A. L. R. 1442 (1926); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L.Ed. 569 (1899);
Foster v. Charles Betcher Lumber Co., 5 S. D. 57, 58 N.W. 9, 23 L. R. A. 490 (1894);
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed.
167. 128 A. L. R. 1437 (1939).
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which they permitted, belonged to the historical past and,
in the light of the then current context of the situation of na-
tional life, searched for precept and precedent which might
with propriety be applied to the revolutionized commercial
world in which the corporation was assuming larger and larg-
er proportions. 9
As the first step in this arduous process, they "lifted
the corporate veil." They beheld an aggregation of indivi-
duals and came to the conclusion that the corporation was
in fact identical with its stockholders. 0 By syllogistic rea-
soning, they propounded the tenet that since the corporation
was its stockholders and since the stockholders could "mi-
grate," so, therefore, could the corporation migrate, at least
to the extent that the court might rationally fashion some
link between its legitimate exercise of power and this in-
visible, incorporeal "scintilla" of a being which had been
clothed with the capacity to migrate into the territory over
which the court might extend its jurisdictional power.4'
The courts looked once more at the corporation and its
39 Joseph Henry Beale, "Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners," 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1913). The author of a note in 9 Tex. L. Rev. 410 at 422 (1931) states:
"The varying boundaries of our economic and political frontiers have in the
past necessitated continuous changes in our jurisdictional concepts of the extra-
territorial status of foreign corporations. Any immediate stabilization of those
frontiers is improbable. Hence it is submitted that the absence of any definite
rule is not deplorable, but rather, fortunate. The question of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations has been and, it is believed, is being decided, within certain
broad boundaries, by a judicious use of judicial discretion, not uninfluenced by
the reasonableness of its exercise in each particular case."
40 Edward S. Stimson, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 18 St. Louis
L. Rev. 195 (1932); George C. Holt, The Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Federal
and State Courts (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1888) 110-1 and cases there
cited. He states: ". . . the Supreme Court modified it (the view "that all the
members of the corporation should be citizens of the State which created it") by
establishing a fiction that the members of a corporation are presumed by law to
be citizens of the State which created the corporation. The statement of the rule
by the Supreme Court is that a suit by or against a corporation in its corporate
name may be presumed to be a suit by or against citizens of the State which
created the corporate body. . ." Henderson, op. cit. 164, states: "A business
firm is incorporated, and accorded legal personality, merely because that is,
juristically, the most satisfactory way of achieving a desired result . . . The
vice of Marshall's theory of corporation law lay rather in its tendency to over-
look the fact that this invisible, law-created entity is devised for the purpose of
protecting the interests of a very tangible and 'real' group of men with tangible
common property and common interests. It is this group that is generally the
fact of primary importance; the legal entity is no more than a means to an
end. .. "
41 Even though a judgment rendered in a state court without personal service
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legal relations with other entities in its environment. They
looked to the State itself and determined that the State, in
the exercise of its police power, could legally exclude for-
eign corporations from the prosecution of their business ac-
tivities within its territorial boundaries.42 As a logical con-
sequence it was held to be constitutional for the State to en-
act legislation restricting the circumstances in which it would
countenance the transaction by the corporation of business
within its boundaries. 43 The only limitation placed upon the
on the defendant may be good in that state, nevertheless, it may be void
everywhere else: Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed.
517 (1895); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed.
964 (1898); Grover and Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287,
11 S. Ct. 92, 34 L. Ed. 670 (1890); The Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
(U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856). Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a court may
find some means of obtaining and exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion, the resulting judgment may be binding in the "local" sense only, and not in
the "international" sense. It may not be entitled to full faith and credit in the
courts of a sister state: Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 27 S. Ct. 434, 51 L. Ed.
745 (1907); Vallely v. Northern F. & M. Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116, 65
L. Ed. 297 (1920); United States ex rel. Rauch v. Davis, 8 F. (2d) 907 (1925); Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167, 128
A. L. R. 1437 (1939); Hunau v. Northern Region Supply Corp., 262 F. 181 (1920).
See also Willis, "Corporations and the United States Constitution," 8 U. of Cinn.
L. Rev. 1 (1934); comments in 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1010 (1929) and 79 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 956 (1931); Willis, op. cit. 688; and Goodrich, op. cit. 155.
42 See The Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856);
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882); Old Wayne Mutual
Life Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907);
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 10 L. Ed. 274 (1839); Baltimore &
0. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 65, 20 L. Ed. 354 (1871); Ex parte Schollen-
berger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1878); State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin &
Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256, 89
A. L. R. 653 (1933); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309
U. S. 4, 60 S. Ct. 215, 84 L. Ed. 537 (1940); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168, 19
L. Ed. 357 (1869); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 12 S. Ct.
403, 36 L. Ed. 164 (1892). See also Christopher G. Tiedman, A Treatise on State
and Federal Control of Persons and Property (F. H. Thomas Law Book Co.,
St. Louis, Mo., 1900) 982-7 and 1039; Willis, op. cit. 865; Simkins, op. cit. 105 and
225; Thompson, op. cit. V, 1433 and 1556 and cases there cited; Restatement of
the Law of Conflict of Laws, § 91, comments b and c, and § 169; Stumberg,
op. cit. 82, particularly notes 68-9; Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Con-
stitutional Law (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1939) 856; Austin W. Scott,
"Jurisdiction over Nonresidents doing business within the State," 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 871 (1919); and notes in 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. 485 (1931), 9 Minn. L. Rev. 362 (1925).
43 See cases listed in note 42, ante, and Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15
S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20
S. Ct. 518, 44 L. Ed. 657 (1900); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
270, 20 L. Ed. 571 (1872); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147,
23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987 (1903); American R. Exp. Co. v. Royster Guano Co.,
273 U. S. 274, 47 S. Ct. 355, 71 L. Ed. 642 (1927); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Ship-
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ability of the state to impose such conditions precedent was
that the same should be reasonable and should not effect a
denial to the corporation of any of the rights guaranteed to
it as a "person" by the Constitution of the United States." A
foreign corporation thereafter desiring to do business with-
in such state could receive the latter's license to do so by
complying with the provisions specified in the statute pre-
scribing the terms upon which such permission would be
granted.45 A large number of statutes thus enacted outlined
the method by which and the causes for which foreign cor-
porations might be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the state in question.46 A voluntary compliance with the
building Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939); Sansbury v.
Schwartz, 41 F. Supp. 302 (1941); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron
Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075, L. R. A. 1916F 407, Ann. Cas. 1918A 389 (1916);
State v. St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co., 58 W. Va. 108, 51 S.E. 865,
1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 558 (1905), affirmed in 203 U. S. 183, 27 S. Ct. 132, 51 L. Ed. 144
(1906); Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co., 106 Wis. 396, 82 N.W. 308, 80
Am. St. Rep. 41, 50 L. R. A. 577 (1900); and Silva v. Crombie & Co., 39 N. Mex.
240, 44 P. (2d) 719 (1935).
44 Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 120 F. 893 (1903); Barrow Steamship Co. v.
Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Jones v. Consolidated
Wagon & Machine Co., 31 F. (2d) 383 (1929), appeal dismissed in 280 U. S. 519,
50 S. Ct. 65, 74 L. Ed. 589 (1929); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629,
56 S. Ct. 611, 80 L. Ed. 943 (1936); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235,
49 S. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287, 60 A. L. R. 596 (1929); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S.
186, 7 S. Ct. 931, 30 L. Ed. 915 (1887); Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 410, 19
L. Ed. 972 (1871); W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452., 21 S. Ct. 423, 45
L. Ed. 619 (1901); Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 26 S. Ct. 66, 50
L. Ed. 246 (1905); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U. S. 23, 22 S. Ct. 5,
46 L. Ed. 61 (1901); Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297
(1895); Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 20 Wall. (U.S.) 445, 22 L. Ed. 365
(1874); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148 (1877); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 942 (1892); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426, 46 S. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664 (1926); Frost v.
Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101 (1926); Hanover
Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 272 U. S. 494, 47 S. Ct. 179, 71 L. Ed. 372 (1926); Power
Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 47 S. Ct. 678, 71 L. Ed. 1165 (1927), and cases
listed in note 43. See also Lucius Polk McGehee, Due Process of Law under the
Federal Constitution (Edward Thompson Co., Northport, N. Y. 1906) 102; Thomp-
son, op. cit. V, 1456-7; Cooley, op. cit. 21, note 6; and Goodrich, op. cit. 173.
45 In State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S.
361 at 364, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256 at 1259 (1933) it was !tated: "It has
repeatedly been said that qualification of a foreign corporation in accordance with
the statutes permitting its entry into the State constitutes an assent on its part
to all the reasonable conditions imposed." See also The Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co.
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610
(1917), and Thompson, op. cit. V, 1537.
46 Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on
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provisions of such statutes was construed to be an express
assent by the corporation (1) to be bound by the state's
"cwill" so manifested, (2) to comply with the terms of the
statute, and (3) to subject itself, in the manner stipulated, to
the court's jurisdiction. 7 This consent was deemed a suf-
ficient basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction. 8
If, notwithstanding the enactment of such statutes and
the consequent imposition of such conditions, the corporation
operated in a foreign state without specifically conforming
to the procedure set forth by the state legislature, then such
operation automatically subjected it to the terms established
by the state. An implied consent to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the courts of that state would then be imputed to
the corporation in its "personified" capacity.4" This implied
Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935), and see particularly statutes
cited in notes 13-19 and 39-42 inclusive. See also note 93 post.
47 Culp, id., at 391 states: "Everyone within the boundaries of a state is bound
by all of its laws which it may constitutionally adopt; any consent which it may
exact under its general legislative power cannot fairly be called a voluntary
consent, and therefore the terms of the consent should be fair and equitable."
See cases listed in note 42., ante, and Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley,
172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Commercial Mut. Accident Co.
v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782 (1909); Rarden v. R. D. Baker
Co., 279 Mich. 145, 271 N.W. 712 (1937); Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Koontz,
104 U. S. 5, 26 L. Ed. 643 (1881); O'Donnell v. Slade, 5 F. Supp. 265 (1933);
Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S.E. 723, 45 A. L. R.
1442 (1926); and Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674, 2 Ann. Cas.
207, 70 L. R. A. 513 (1905). See also William J. Kinnally, "What Constitutes Doing
Business by a Foreign Corporation?" 15 Ind. L. J. 520 (1940).
48 Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 329 (1928), affirmed in 279
U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929); Barnes v. Wilson, 40 F. Supp. 689
(1941); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). See also
G. W. C. Ross, "The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction," 17 Minn. L. Rev. 146 (1933).
49 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236:
51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59
L. Ed. 492 (1915); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19
S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
270, 20 L. Ed. 571 (1872); Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. Clow, 204 U. S. 286,
27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488 (1907), where it was said: "It is tacitly conceded that
the provision as to service does not apply unless the foreign corporation was
doing business in the state. If it was, then, under the decisions of this court, it
would be taken to have assented to the condition upon which alone it lawfully
could transact such business there."; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Troell,
30 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 70 S.W. 324 (1902); Van Dresser v. Oregon Ry. and Nay.
Co., 48 F. 202 (1891); Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 260 P.
745 (1927); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432,
111 N.E. 1075, L. R. A. 1916F 407 (1916); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal
& Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (1915); Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co., 106 Wis.
396, 82 N.W. 308, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41, 50 L. R. A. 577 (1900); Reeves v. Southern
Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674, 70 L. R. A. 513 (1905); State ex rel. Taylor
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consent would, as the express consent did, form the basis
for the exercise of the court's jurisdiction." Here, then, was
a liaison of great utility to the courts in effecting a remedy
for the situation which had threatened to produce inequities
in legal relations between parties and to throw an unrea-
sonable burden upon the citizens of the court's own domestic
state by the previous requirement that such citizens sue the
offending corporation only in the state of the latter's crea-
tion.5
The test of the real validity of a theory of jurisdiction is
its universal applicability. Difficulties were encountered in
an attempt to apply the "consent" doctrine to all situations
involving suits against foreign corporations. In cases where
the state in question had not enacted any statutes in this
connection, it might have been anticipated that conflicts
would ensue as, in fact, they have. 52 A conflict in this re-
spect, however, did not seriously jeopardize the theory of
jurisdiction, because it could be, and in some cases was,
rationalized by holding that the state had power to impose
conditions, that the imposition of reasonable conditions was
therefore presumed and that consent, either express or im-
plied, could be established in the same manner as that em-
ployed in the case of states which had enacted statutes. 53
Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 57 P. (2d) 772, 113 A. L. R. 1 (1936).
Consider also Goodrich, op. cit. 166 and 178; and Scott, "Jurisdiction over Non-
residents Doing Business Within a State," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871 (1919).
50 See note 99 post.
51 Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 F. (2d) 851 (1931); Bagdon v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075, L. R. A. 1916F 407
(1916); Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674, 70 L. R. A. 513 (1905).
See also Paul E. Farrier, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 17 Minn. L.
Rev. 270 (1933), and Louis Paul Haffer, "Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations as Defendants in the United States Supreme Court," 17 Bost. U. L. Rev.
639 (1937).
52 Thompson, op. cit. V, 1535 and 1555-7. See also notes 102, and 104 post.
53 Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0. R. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S.E. 101, 30 A. L. R. 248
(1923). The annotator defines as a basis of jurisdiction the implied consent raised
by the doing business either because of a specific statute or by judicial construc-
tion or by reason of an imputation of liability to suit in consideration of the pro-
tection afforded by the foreign state. See also note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at
967 (1931) where the author states: "Yet the theory (of consent) is untenable.
Frequently such consent, either subjectively or objectively, does not exist, yet
jurisdiction has been assumed and sustained. For example, the lack of statutory
provision authorizing the suit will not defeat such assumption of jurisdiction,
although it is difficult to understand how the corporation can consent to a
statutory condition of admission where there is no statute."
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A mortal blow was dealt to the consent theory, how-
ever, when an attempt was made to apply it to the following
two situations: first, where the corporation expressly refused
to comply with or be bound by the conditions imposed by
the state,54 and second, where the corporation involved was
one engaged solely in interstate commerce, by reason of
which the state was without power to exclude it from carry-
ing on its interstate business within the state territorial
boundaries." In the former circumstance, any fiction
of "consent" was directly repudiated. In the latter instance,
the major premise upon which the consent doctrine was
founded, namely the right of exclusion, never existed. In
either event, the structure of the consent theory perforce col-
lapsed.56
Upon the defection of the "consent" doctrine, another
search was instituted, and the courts once more focused their
inquiring attention upon the nature of the corporation, its
composition, and its now well-recognized capacity to migrate.
This time, instead of looking to the state, they scrutinized
the nature of their own jurisdiction and broke it down into
its component parts. At the root they found the venerable
postulate that "jurisdiction is physical power." 7 Essential
to the exercise of physical power over natural persons is the
physical presence of the latter. The incorporeal corporation
cannot realistically be "present" in the physical sense any-
54 Goodrich, op. cit. 173-4, particularly note 168.
55 International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 S. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed.
678 (1910); Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, 42 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458
(1922); Sansbury v. Schwartz, 41 F. Supp. 302 (1941); Esperti v. Cardinale Truck-
ing Corp., 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 253 (1941); Costello v. Lee, 43 F. Supp. 947 (1941);
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). See also notes
89-90 post. Willis, op. cit. 865, states: "Since the state had the power to keep a
foreign corporation out of the state, it could, as a condition of allowing it to come
into the state, require it to consent to the appointment of an agent for the service
of process, etc., but when the jurisdiction was upheld against a corporation
which was engaged only in interstate commerce, which the state could not keep
out, the consent theory broke down (citing International Harvester Co. of America
v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 [1914])." See also Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws, § 92, comment c.
56 Willis, op. cit. 866, states: "The adoption of the presence theory did not, how-
ever, mean the discarding of the consent theory."
57 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93,
37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. (2d) 139
(1930). See also G. W. C. Ross, "The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction," 17 Minn. L.
Rev. 146 (1933).
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where but its "members" can. Hence, the presence of the
"members" or agents who carry on its corporate activities
has been construed to be the presence of the corporation,
the two classes of persons being in point of fact identical."
Therefore, in order to conjoin the corporation and the exer-
cise of the court's jurisdiction, it has been held to be sufficient
if the former be "present" within that region in which the
latter may be effectively exercised."9
This doctrine, like the "consent" doctrine, also failed
to be susceptible of universal application as exemplified by
actions permitted against foreign corporations after their dis-
solution"0 or after their withdrawal from the state of suit.61
58 Apparently, the first case basing jurisdiction on the presence of the corpora-
tion manifested by its doing business was Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins.
Co., 25 N. J. L. 57 (1855). The first such case in the United States Supreme
Court was St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57
L. Ed. 486 (1913). Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct.
280, 61 L. Ed. 710 (1916), illustrates the theory that a naturalistic view should be
taken of a foreign corporation, recognizing that it is, in fact, a group, and is
"present" wherever group activities are carried on. See also Rosenberg Bros. &
Co. v. Curtis, Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923); Con-
solidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85, 53 S. Ct. 529, 77 L. Ed. 1047 (1933);
Hinchcliffe Motors, Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 580 (1939);
Sansbury v. Schwartz, 41 F. Supp. 302 (1941); Richardson v. North American
Clay Co., 41 F. Supp. 528 (1941); Bellar v. Lake Erie Chemical Co., 41 F. Supp.
676 (1941); Westor Theatres, Inc., v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757
(1941). But see also Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286
F. 566 (1922). See also Willis, op. cit. 296, and Isaacs, "An Analysis of Doing Busi-
ness," 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018 (1925).
59 The author of a note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1931) appears to believe
that the greatest reliance is to be placed upon and credence given to the
"presence" doctrine, indicating that what the Supreme Court has really done has
been to create a new jurisdictional basis which it terms "corporate presence."
See: International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct.
944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1916); Simon v. Southern Ry.
Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492 (1915); Minn. Com. Men's Asso. v.
Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 43 S. Ct. 293, 67 L. Ed. 573 (1923); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711 (1929); Rosenberg Bros. & Co.
v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923); Bank of
America v. Whitney Central Nat. Bank, 261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed. 594
(1923); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69
L. Ed. 634 (1925); Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556,
67 L. Ed. 996 (1923); New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 13 S. Ct.
444, 37 L. Ed. 292 (1893) ; Conhecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602,
19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213
U. S. 245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782 (1909); Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden
Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201 (1921).
60 See notes 115-9, inclusive, post.
61 See notes 115-9, inclusive, post, and also State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin &
Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256, 89
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The numerous instances in which jurisdiction has been ex-
ercised under such circumstances, though the corporation is
not even theoretically present, precludes an acceptance of
this concept as the basis upon which jurisdiction may be
founded.62
A great many other theories concerning the basis of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations have been promulgat-
ed, more or less local and sporadic in their application, and
more or less consistently adhered to by the courts of their
inception. Among these are included the following:
1. Waiver by the corporation of its potential plea of "no
jurisdiction" may be accomplished in any one of several
ways. Such waiver would not confer jurisdiction upon the
courts but the courts would be assumed to possess jurisdic-
tion to entertain actions against foreign corporations sub-
ject to the personal privileges of the latter to be immunized
therefrom. 3 This personal privilege could be waived by
qualification to do business under the statutory require-
ments of the particular state,6" by appearance in the
suit,65 or by other acts calculated to waive and construed
as waiving such privilege. 66
2. The state possesses a police power which may be exer-
A. L. R. 653 (1933); Sansbury v. Schwartz, 41 F. Supp. 302 (1941). See also Good-
rich, op. cit. 176, particularly note 173, and Stumberg, op. cit. 90, note 88.
62 See cases listed in note 61, ante, and in notes 115-9, inclusive, post.
63 Merchants' Heat & Light Co. v. Clow, 204 U. S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed.
488 (1907); St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 11 S. Ct.
982, 35 L. Ed. 659 (1891); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Mill-
ing Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1916). See also cases cited in
brief of defendant in error in Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Co., 309 U. S. 4, 60 S. Ct. 215, 84 L. Ed. 537 (1940).
64 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U. S. 4, 60 S. Ct.
215, 84 L. Ed. 537 (1940); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S.
165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939). See also note in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
REVIEw 135 (1940).
65 The Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856);
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed.
372 (1923); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 S. Ct.
579, 59 L. Ed. 910 (1915); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, 33 S. Ct. 550,
57 L. Ed. 867 (1910); Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 329 (1928)
affirmed in 279 U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929), though appearance
held not to be a waiver of defect in service; Farmers' & Merchants' Bank V.
Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922). See also Willis, op. cit. 687; Cooley, op.
cit. 854-5, note 1; Rottschaefer, op. cit. 856.
66 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed.
1097 (1935); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U. S. 4,
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cised by imposing conditions upon the transaction of busi-
ness by foreign corporations within its borders.67 The corpor-
ation may also be construed to submit to such conditions in a
manner similar to that previously considered in connection
with the "consent" doctrine.6"
3. The state has the power to exclude foreign corporations
from its territory.69 If it does not so exclude them, but rather
consents to permit them to transact business within the
state, then, as a consideration for the granting of such con-
sent, the corporation subjects itself or is construed to have
subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of that
state.
70
4. As a matter of propriety and for the convenience of its
own citizens, the state can require the compliance with rea-
sonable conditions precedent to the transacting of business
by a foreign corporation within the state.71 Such corporation
must then accede to the imposition of and must comply
with such conditions.72
5. The corporation entering another state, and carrying on
60 S. Ct. 215, 84 L. Ed. 537 (1940); Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. Ed.
853 (1878); Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 65, 20 L. Ed.
354 (1871); Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. Ed. 643
(1881). See also Restatement of Law of Conflict of Laws, § 91.
67 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed.
1097 (1935); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566
(1922). See also Maurice S. Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-resident
Motorists," 32 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1934).
68 Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84
L. Ed. 167 (1939), and note thereon in 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 135 (1940);
Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85, 53 S. Ct. 529, 77 L. Ed. 1047
(1933); People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233,
62 L. Ed. 587 (1918); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F.
148 (1915); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566
(1922). Paul E. Farrier, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations," 17 Minn. L.
Rev. 270 (1933), states that there is no exact support for submission theory in
cases but it may be implied from St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S.
218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486 (1913), and Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244
U. S. 68, 37 S. Ct. 599, 61 L. Ed. 997 (1917).
69 See note 42 ante.
70 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922);
Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S.E. 723, 45 A. L. R.
1442 (1926); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917). See also Thompson, op. cit. V, 1537-8.
71 Hinton, "Substituted Service on Nonresidents," 20 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1925), and
note in 11 Tex. L. Rev. 226 (1933). See also Willis, op. cit. 866.
72 Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935), and note in 9 Minn. L.
Rev. 362 (1925).
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business there under and by virtue of the pertinent laws of
that state, establishes a domicile there which forms the basis
of jurisdiction of the courts of that state in actions against
such corporation.73
6. It is reasonable for a foreign corporation which is doing
business within another state to be subject to suit therein.7 4
A doctrine which has, in comparatively recent years,
found wide favor in view of the changes in commercial life
wrought by the advent of the industrial era and machine
age, and one which is based upon a sound and logical foun-
dation is that jurisdiction may be exercised on the basis of
the performance by the defendant foreign corporation
of some act or acts within the state.75 Under a similar theory
73 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93,
37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917).
74 Culp, id. 375 at 378, states: "In the last analysis it seems that a theory
which takes into account the constitutional limitations and restraints upon the
unlimited power of a state over a foreign corporation must be based upon broad
concepts of public necessity and convenience which render the exercise of
judicial authority over a foreign corporation reasonable when its activity begins
to have an important influence upon the residents, and of the theories proposed
the reasonable regulation basis seems to be the most realistic and the best
adapted to withstand continuous attack." For a judicial expression of the same
view, see Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 at
588 (1922), where the court states: "The existence of jurisdiction . . . depends
upon whether, in view of the ultimate facts thereof, the exercise of jurisdiction
would be reasonable. If it is . . . reasonable . . . it (jurisdiction) exists. If, on
the other hand, it is not reasonable, it does not exist." See also Roger S. Foster,
"Place of Trial in Civil Actions," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1930), and note in 28
Calif. L. Rev. 227 (1940).
75 St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882); Goldey v.
Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed. 517 (1895); Riverside & Dan
River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 S. Ct. 579, 59 L. Ed. 910 (1915);
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916
(1907); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308,
43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222
(1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927);
Minnesota Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 43 S. Ct. 293, 67 L. Ed.
573 (1923); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 254 F. 513 (1918) cert. den.
249 U. S. 602, 39 S. Ct. 2.59, 63 L. Ed. 797 (1919); Fry v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,
226 F. 893 (1915); Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674, 2 Ann. Cas.
207 (1905); Steele v. Western Union Tel. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S.E. 583, 96 A. L. R.
361 (1934); Kinsey v. American Ore Corporation, -Ark.-, 158 S.W. (2d) 32 (1942);
Atkinson v. U. S. Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 152 N.W. 410, L. R. A. 1916E 241
(1915). See also Helen W. Munsert, "Doing Business in a State for the Purpose
of Service of Process on a Foreign Corporation," 13 CHICAGO-IENT REVIEw 328
(1935); Willis, "Corporations and the United States Constitution," 8 U. of Cin. L.
Rev. 1 (1934); Louis Paul Haffer, "Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corpora-
tions as Defendants in the United States Supreme Court," 17 Bost. L. Rev. 639
(1937); and Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, §§ 89, 92.
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applicable to individuals, there is a substantial body of au-
thority which holds that residents of another state who have
driven their cars upon the highways of the state of the forum,
causing some damage or injury thereby, are liable therefor
and may be brought within the jurisdiction of the court by
the service of process upon some state official named in stat-
utes relating thereto.76 Jurisdiction in these cases is based
upon statutes which provide that the foreign motorist, by
the very act of entering upon and using the highways of the
state, is construed as having appointed the secretary of state.
or other state official, as his agent for the service of
process. 7 Such statutes have been held to be a constitution-
al exercise by the state of its police power in furnishing pro-
tection to its citizens against the consequences of the use of
a dangerous instrumentality. 8 Upon the same reasoning, for-
eign corporations engaged in the insurance business and for-
eign stockbrokers have been held subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state in which they have transacted bus-
iness. 79 The same doctrine has been extended to render ef-
fective the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of a state
76 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). Goodrich,
op. cit. 166, says: "It is not accurate to speak of this as jurisdiction based on
consent. It may be doubtful if the visitor even knows of the provision, much less
consents to it. It must be said that when one commits acts (at least some kinds of
acts) in a state, it lies within the power of that state to make him amenable to
its courts in litigation arising from those acts. The foreign corporation cases,
later discussed, furnish an analogy here." See also Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230 (1929); Morris v. Argo-
Collier Truck Line, 39 F. Supp. 602 (1941); Wood v. Wim. B. Reilly & Co., 40 F.
Supp. 507 (1941).
77 See note 17 CHICAGO-KNT LAw REViEw 69 (1938) and Bouchillon v. Jordan,
40 F. Supp. 354 (1941).
78 See cases cited note 76, ante.
79 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed.
1097 (1935); Minnesota Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 43 S. Ct.
293, 67 L. Ed. 573 (1923). Goodrich, op. cit. 168, says: "The Supreme Court in
the Hess v. Pawloski case stressed the dangerous character of motor vehicles; in
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, Justice McReynolds said: 'Iowa treats the business
of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional, and subjects it to special
regulation.' Perhaps this is our clue. Both the sale of securities and the operation
of motor vehicles are fraught with danger and economic harm to the general
public. For that reason they are held subject to regulation by the states. By
holding such acts to create jurisdiction for suits arising therefrom in the state
where the acts are committed the courts are merely affording a further protec-
tion to the injured. Whether this is the line on which the decisions will eventually
crystallize is as yet unpredictable."
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over all corporations entering and doing business therein.80
It is not that the corporation is "present" or has "consented"
to be brought within the realm of the court's jurisdiction,
but the theory is based upon the hypothesis that, by the per-
formance of the act itself, the corporation has subjected it-
self to that jurisdiction. "
Courts recognizing the concept of jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations based upon the performance of an act or of
"doing business," uniformly hold that such "doing" of busi-
ness in the state of suit is an absolute essential to compe-
tent jurisdiction and the pronouncement of binding judg-
80 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711
(1929); Fitzgerald and Mallory Const. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 11 S. Ct. 36,
34 L. Ed. 608 (1890); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39
L. Ed. 517 (1895); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526,
42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147,
23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987 (1903); Meyer v. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 108 F. 169 (1901); Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121
F. (2d) 112 (1941); Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S.E. 674, 70 L. R. A.
513 (1905); Steele v. Western Union Tel. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S.E. 583, 96
A. L. R. 361 (1934); Atkinson v. United States Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 152 N.W.
410, L. R. A. 1916E 241 (1915); Kinsey v. American Ore Corp., 158 S.W. (2d) 32
(Ark., 1942). The annotator in 89 A. L. R. 653 (1933) distinguishes between non-
resident motorists and foreign corporations along three lines: (1) the State may
exclude the latter; (2) the foreign corporation having qualified to do business,
is governed by the rules and regulations of the state department, and is therefore
in a better position to know the service provisions of venue statutes; and (3) the
corporation may avoid the effect of the statutes by appointing its own agent for
service. In 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 at 1126 appears the statement that: "At one
time it was believed that the ownership of a substantial amount of permanent
property within the state constituted an absolute prerequisite to inclusion within
the meaning of the Amendment . . . But more recent cases have discarded the
rule . . . In Kentucky Finance Corporation v. Paramount Automobile Exchange
Corporation, [262 U. S. 544, 43 S. Ct. 636, 67 L. Ed. 1112] decided in 1923, a
foreign corporation coming into the state to replevy an automobile but not other-
wise owning property or doing business was held to be a person within the
jurisdiction; and three years later the applicability of the amendment was
similarly sustained in Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Harding [272 U. S.
494, 47 S. Ct. 179, 71 L. Ed. 372] where the corporation's only asset within the
state was good will." See also Helen W. Munsert, "Doing Business in a State for
the Purpose of Service of Process on a Foreign Corporation," 13 CHICAG-KENT
REVmw 328 (1935), and notes in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 135 (1940) and 24
Corn. L. Q. 266 (1939).
81 Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 260 P. 745 (1927);
Hinchcliffe Motors, Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 580 (1939);
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (1915). Goodrich,
op. cit. 177, states: "If a foreign corporation voluntarily does business within
the state it is bound by reasonable regulations of that business imposed by the
state, not because it is found there, not because it has consented to those regula-
tions, but because it is reasonable and just to subject the corporation to those
regulations as though it had consented."
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ments.82 Conflict does occur, however, in their decisions
relative to the quantum of "doing business" required to
support adequately the exercise of that jurisdiction. With
scarcely a deviation the courts agree that the requi-
site amount cannot be arbitrarily designated or defined in
advance, but is strictly a question of fact to be decided
after a consideration of all circumstances peculiar to a par-
ticular case. 8 Some of the determinative factors consid-
ered by the courts in assessing the varying factual situa-
82 Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed.
710 (1917); International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579,
34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley,
172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 942 (1892); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane,
170 U. S. 10D, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350,
1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882); Fitzgerald and Mallory Const. Co. v. Fitzgerald,
137 U. S. 98, 11 S. Ct. 36, 34 L. Ed. 608 (1890); Merchant's Heat & Light Co. v.
Clow, 204 U. S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488 (1907); Chipman v. Thos. B. Jeffrey
Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314 (1920); Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841 (1907); Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F. (2d) 139 (1930); Creager v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 36 F. (2d) 783
(1929); Zendle v. Garfield Aniline Works, Inc., 29 F. (2d) 415 (1928); Central Grain
& Stock Exch. v. Board of Trade, 125 F. 463 (1903). In Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922) at 595, in commenting on the
case of Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, the court said: "There is nothing in the
case that suggests the idea that in such cases, if process has been served on an
authorized agent, it is essential also to jurisdiction that the corporation be doing
business in the state."
88 Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed.
996 (1923). Austin Gavin, "Doing Business as Applied to Foreign Corporations,"
11 Temp. L. Q. 46 at 60 (1936), states: "Isolated or casual transactions accom-
panied by no intent of continuity are not 'doing business' unless they constitute
the sole reason for organizing the corporation. For state regulation to apply the
foreign corporation must carry out a substantial part of its corporate purpose . . .
therefore the collection of debts, the taking of security, the maintenance of a
bank account, the sale of its own stock and an action at law do not of them-
selves constitute a doing of business. For the same reason acts relating solely to
the management or control of the internal affairs of the corporation, such as the
holding of corporate meetings or the transfer of stock do not bring the corporation
within the state. But the contrary is true of the maintenance within the state
of the executive offices. Nor does the, ownership of stock of a corporation acting
within Pennsylvania constitute the doing of business unless the subsidiary cor-
poration acts in the capacity of agent. The ownership of real property, however,
has such an effect. The ownership of personal property alone is not sufficient
unless the corporation thereby carries out its corporate purposes . . . Orders for
goods outside . . . are within the protection of the commerce clause. But if the
goods are within the state when sold the states regulations apply provided the
sale is made on behalf of the foreign corporation." See also Osborne, "Arising
out of Business Done in the State," 7 Minn. L. Rev. 380 (1923); Isaacs, "An
Analysis of Doing Business," 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018 (1925) and notes in 14 Mich.
L. Rev. 588 (1916); 31 Yale L. J. 205 (1921); 14 Va. L. Rev. 133 (1927); 15 Iowa
L. Rev. 204 (1930); 29 Col. L. Rev. 187 (1929) and 28 Calif. L. Rev. 227 (1940).
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tions are: the place of residence of the plaintiff, the place
where the cause of action arose, whether or not the foreign
corporation has complied with the pertinent state statutes,
the time when the necessary transacting of business
occurred, whether or not the corporation had withdrawn
from the state or had been dissolved prior to the date of
suit, and the court in which the action is instituted, whether
federal or state."' The quantum of business required may,
and very often expressly does, vary with any change in any
one or more of the foregoing so that it may be said that a
mutual dependence exists between the designation of a par-
ticular amount of "doing business" and those factors, which
are hereinafter discussed.
The nature of the transactions considered essential to
bestow jurisdiction upon the courts is directly influ-
enced, also, by the purpose of the litigation, which may be
classified, for the purposes of this discussion, into three prin-
cipal categories: (1) suits involving the necessity of qualify-
ing to do business under the state statutes; 5 (2) actions
based upon the imposition of state taxes;86 and (3) questions
concerning the proper venue when a foreign corporation is
a party defendant, that is, the amenability of the foreign cor-
poration to the service of process within the state. 7 The
quantum of business required diminishes progressively in
the order in which those categories are designated.88
84 Isadore M. Kanevsky, "Corporations-What constitutes 'Transacting Busi-
ness' in Wisconsin by a Foreign Corporation," 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 380 (1941), and
note in 10 Jour. of Air Law 430 (1939).
85 Whitaker v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 105 F. (2d) 44 (1939); Hinchcliffe
Motors, Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 580 (1939); International
Text-Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N. Y. 313, 115 N.E. 914 (1917). See also William J.
Kinnally, "What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign Corporation?", 15 Ind.
L. J. 520 (1940).
86 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477,
69 L. Ed. 916 (1925); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 38 S. Ct.
295, 62 L. Ed. 632 (1918). Compare Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 254 F.
513 (1918) cert. den. 249 U. S. 602, 39 S. Ct. 259, 63 L. Ed. 797 (1910) with Wash-
ington-Virginia R. Co. v. Real Estate Trust Co., 238 U. S. 185, 35 S. Ct. 818, 59 L.
Ed. 1262 (1915).
87 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed.
1097 (1935); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. (2d) 139 (1930); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Cockburn v. Kinsley,
25 Colo. App. 89, 135 P. 1112 (1913).
88 See Helen W. Munsert, "Doing Business in a State for the Purpose of Service
of Process on a Foreign Corporation," 13 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 328 (1935).
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Closely related to the question of the quantum of "doing
business" required is the distinction between the transaction
of interstate business and that of intrastate character. The
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations engaged
in interstate business is far more strictly limited than it is
with respect to foreign corporations engaged in intrastate bus-
iness, and may require either a greater amount of business
or transactions of a more specific character. 9 Where in-
terstate business is involved, the protection of the commerce
clause may be invoked. Frequently, therefore, courts may
not constitutionally take jurisdiction in suits against foreign
interstate corporations by reason of the imposition thereby
of undue burdens upon interstate commerce. 90 A survey of
89 Furst v. Brewster, 282 U. S. 493, 51 S. Ct. 295, 75 L. Ed. 478 (1931); Davis
v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996 (1923);
Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47,
69 L. Ed. 247 (1924); Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct.
485, 71 L. Ed. 905 (1927); Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 62
S. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295 (1932); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 228 Mass.
584, 117 N.E. 913 (1917) affirmed in 255 U. S. 565, 41 S. Ct. 446, 65 L. Ed. 788
(1921); St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed.
486 (1913); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed.
916 (1907); Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61
L. Ed. 710 (1917); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43
S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923); Bank of America v. Whitney Central Nat. Bank,
261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed. 594 (1923); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899); Penna. Lumber-
men's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 25 S. Ct. 483, 49 L. Ed. 810
(1905); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct.
236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S.
245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782 (1909); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Hireen v.
Interstate Transit Lines, 52 F. (2d) 182 (1931); U. S. Merchants' & Shippers' Ins.
Co. v. Elder Dempster & Co., 62 F. (2d) 59 (1932); King v. Robinson Transfer
Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 223, 13 S.E. (2d) 233 (1941); Guerin Mills v. Barrett, 254
N. Y. 380, 173 N.E. 553 (1930); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115
N.E. 915 (1917).
90 International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 S. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed. 678
(1910); Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50, 42 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 458
(1922); International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34
S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914); Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49
S. Ct. 207, 73 L. Ed. 470 (1929); Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284,
52 S. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295 (1932); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v.
Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247 (1924); International Milling Co. v.
Columbia T. Co., 292 U. S. 511, 54 S. Ct. 797, 78 L. Ed. 1396 (1934); Hoffman v.
Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, 71 L. Ed. 905 (1927); Sioux
Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 S. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193 (1914); Philadelphia
& R. R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710 (1917); Simon
v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492 (1915); Cheney
Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 38 S. Ct. 295, 62 L. Ed. 632 (1918);
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927
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the pertinent cases discloses that the doctrine that, in order
to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the
courts of a state, it must be "doing business" therein, is the
one more universally followed by the courts than is the case
of any of the others hereinbefore analyzed.
Since it has now been established that a corporation may
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state other
than that of its creation on one or more of the theories here-
inabove delineated, it becomes appropriate to consider the
manner in which the foreign corporation may be brought
within the effective operation of the court's power. As the pre-
dominant modern theory is that such jurisdiction is founded
on the doing of business, the methods of bringing the cor-
poration within such jurisdiction will be discussed primarily
in the light of that doctrine, although, more frequently than
not, the principles involved are equally applicable when con-
sidered against the background of any of the other bases. As
an inherent part of, or at least closely related to, this re-
quirement, is the further essential that effective service of
process must be had upon some agent of the corporation
who stands in a representative relation to the corporation.9 1
The procedural element of due process required at this junc-
ture comprises an adequate notice to the corporation of the
pendency of litigation against it, served upon such person
and in such manner as is reasonably calculated to "reach
the corporation." 92
(1928); Western Union Tele. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355
(1910); Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N.E. 628, 104
A. L. R. 1068 (1936); Miele v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 151 Misc. 137, 2,70
N. Y. S. 788 (1934); McWhorter v. Williams, 2,8 Ala. 632, 155 So. 309 (1934); Boright
v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 180 Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930); Steele v. Western
Union Tele. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S.E. 583 (1934); Iron City Produce Co. v.
Amer. Ry. Express Co., 22 Ohio App. 165, 153 N.E. 316 (1926); American Ry. Ex-
press Co. v. H. Rouw Co., 173 Ark. 810, 294 S.W. 401 (1927); Cohen v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. S. 667 (1934); Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v.
Tifton Produce Co., 48 Ga. App. 286, 172 S.E. 727 (1934). See also note in 48
Harv. L. Rev. 1433 (1935).
91 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 254 F. 513 (1918); Sasnett v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 90 F. (2d) 514 (1937). See also notes 92, 101, and 104
post and Simkins, op. cit. 223-35.
92 In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 at 24, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 at 451
(1928), the court expressed the opinion that there was: ". . . a general trend
of authority toward sustaining the validity of service of process, if the statutory
provisions in themselves indicate that there is reasonable probability that if the
statutes are complied with, the defendant will receive actual notice .. "
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A majority of the states have enacted statutes specify-
ing the method by which legal process may be served upon
foreign corporations. 93 The provisions of these statutes are
as varied as the number of states. They may, however, be
divided into the following types:
1. Those requiring the formal appointment of a process
agent,94 who would presumably be selected because of his
relationship to the corporation by reason of his serving as
an employee, as officer, or in some other similar capaci-
ty.95
2. Those directing service on the "actual" agent of the
corporation in the state.9 6 Under this type of statute, it is
contemplated that the recipient of process shall be such a
representative of the corporation as is authorized to trans-
act, and who is in fact transacting, the business of the cor-
poration within the state. He may be an officer, "managing
agent," or other employee vested with a representative char-
acter. His capacity to be served inures by reason of his re-
lation to the corporation and not as a result of any formal
appointment as process agent.9 7
3. Those requiring service on some public or state of-
93 Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935), contains a list of statutes
appended as note 13. See also Chipman v. Thos. B. Jeffrey Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40
S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314 (1920); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
217 N. Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075, L. R. A. 1916F 407 (1916); State v. St. Mary's Franco-
American Petroleum Co., 58 W. Va. 108, 51 S.E. 865, 112 Am. St. Rep. 951 (1905)
affirmed in 203 U. S. 183, 27 S. Ct. 132, 51 L. Ed. 144 (1906); State ex rel. Taylor
Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 57 P. (2d) 772, 113 A. L. R. 1 (1936);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P. (2d) 184, 107 A. L. R.
858 (1936).
94 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 S. Ct. 364,
28 L. Ed. 379 (1884); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Mitchell Furniture Co. v.
Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201 (192.1); Morris
& Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929);
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533, 42 S. Ct. 210,
66 L. Ed. 354 (1922). See also 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935) particularly notes 16-7.
95 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922).
96 Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964
(1898); St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed.
486 (1913); Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff, 110 F. (2d) 491 (1940); Lipe v. Carolina
C. & 0. R. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S.E. 101, 30 A. L. R. 248 (1923); Steele v.
Western Union Tele. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S.E. 583, 96 A. L. R. 361 (1934); State
ex rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 57 P. (2d) 772, 113
A. L. R. 1 (1936).
97 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922);
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ficial.98 This category includes both (a) statutes stipulating
that such appointment will be implied by a failure on the
part of the corporation to designate its own agent; 9  and
(b) those requiring the appointment of the state official in
any event.' 0
The purpose of such statutes, as has been expressly
stated, is to accomplish the service of process upon a foreign
corporation in such manner as is competent to bring that
corporation within the jurisdiction of the courts. To achieve
that aim, the essential requirement is that service shall be
had upon such representative in such a manner and with
such adequate safeguards that it will be reasonably certain
that the notice will, in fact, come to the attention of those
individuals responsible for and controlling the management
of the corporation.' Without that, the protection guaran-
teed by "due process" would scarcely be effectuated.
Under statutes requiring the appointment of an "actual"
Mauser v. Union Pac. R. Co., 243 F. 274 (1917); Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Rolaff, 110 F.
(2d) 491 (1940); Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., 41 F. Supp. 48 (1941);
Carpenter v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 710 (1941); Atkinson v. U. S. Operat-
ing Co., 129 Minn. 232, 152 N.W. 410 (1915); Foster v. Charles Betcher Lumber
Co., 5 S. D. 57, 58 N.W. 9 (1894); Steele v. Western Union Tele. Co., 206 N. C. 220,
173 S.E. 583 (1934); Jones v. General Motors Corporation, 197 S. C. 129, 14 S.E.
(2d) 628 (1941); Ange v. General Crushed Stone Co., 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 912 (1941);
Texas Co. v. Cox, -Tenn.-, 156 S.W. (2d) 809 (1941).
98 Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Kever, 260 F. 534 (1919) cert.
den. 250 U. S. 665, 40 S. Ct. 13, 63 L. Ed. 1197 (1919); Mooney v. Buford & George
Mfg. Co., 72 F. 32 (1896); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
217 N. Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075, L. R. A. 1916F 407 (1916); Old Wayne Mutual Life
Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v.
Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 2.55, 59 L. Ed. 492 (1915); Chipman v.
Thos. B. Jeffrey Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314 (1920); Mass. Bond-
ing & Ins. Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (1930).
99 Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492 (1915);
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed.
987 (1903); Fry v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 226 F. 893 (1915); Silva v. Crombie &
Co., 39 N. M. 240, 44 P. (2d) 719 (1935); State ex rel. New York Oil Co. v.
Superior Court, 143 Wash. 641, 255 P. 1030 (1927); American R. Exp. Co. v. Royster
Guano Co., 273 U. S. 274, 47 S. Ct. 355, 71 L. Ed. 642 (1927). See also Maurice S.
Culp, "Process in Actions Against Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State,"
32 Mich. L. Rev. 909 (1934).
100 See Thompson, op. cit. V, 1562 et seq., and 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935)
note 41.
101 Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 at 382 (1935), States: "It Is
perhaps proper to say that service upon a corporation is constructive, at least
substituted, in every case; thus it is necessary that notice be given to some
representative of the corporation. It is not likely that service upon any employee
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or representative agent of the corporation, little difficulty is
encountered. Manifestly, when such appointment is made,
the corporation is expressing its "consent" to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the foreign state and may be construed as
accepting, by its voluntary compliance with the statutes, the
state's conditional offer to permit the corporation to do busi-
ness within its territory. Accordingly, service thus consum-
mated is operative to vest the courts with competent juris-
diction. Even though the corporation fails to designate such
corporate process agent, and the statute does not stipulate
that a state official shall be construed to be appointed by
such failure of designation, service upon an undesignated cor-
porate agent has been held valid. 02 The question of what
agent may, in such instances, be effectively served with pro-
cess is largely determined by the terms of the existing stat-
ute. Thus some statutes authorize service upon the "man-
aging agent."'' 0 3 In the absence of such provision, it is gen-
erally deemed requisite that service be made on some agent
or representative of the corporation who would, in all rea-
sonable probability, apprise the corporation of the service of
such process, 10 though it has been held that the corpora-
of a foreign corporation will be sufficient . . . Unquestionably service upon the
president, secretary, or director of a foreign corporation doing business within a
state is sufficient. Such officers are certainly representative. Likewise, service
upon the managing or general agent of a foreign corporation seems equally good
because of the clear representative relationship to the foreign corporation.
Courts generally consider that the soliciting agents and the claim adjusters
of foreign corporations are likewise of a representative character. On the other
hand, service upon a mere clerk or day laborer or other unrepresentative employee
would seem to be violative of principles of due process of law since there would
scarcely be any reasonable probability that the foreign corporation would have
communicated to it notice of a pending action given to such a person. Service
upon one who has ceased to be an agent, of course, cannot be effective." But see
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 248 F. 970 at 980 (1918): ". . . it may
fairly be presumed that such agent would notify the governing body of the
corporation of any service of citation upon him. No such presumption may be
indulged in cases where there is substituted service upon an official of the state
and not upon an agent of the corporation."
102 St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882): Smolik v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (1915), and cases listed in
note 96 ante.
103 Mauser v. Union Pac. R. Co., 243 F. 2,74 (1917); Cohen v. American Window
Glass Co., 41 F. Supp. 48 (1941). See also note in 8 Notre Dame Law. 105 (1932).
104 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856);
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed.
569 (1899); St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57
L. Ed. 486 (1913); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882);
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tion, upon failure to comply, is estopped to deny the au-
thority of the agent actually served.0 5 Competent service
may likewise be had upon a subsidiary corporation when it
is apparent that the subsidiary in reality represents the for-
eign corporation. 10 6
The statutes of many states require the foreign corpor-
ation to submit to service of process on some state or public
official.10 7 Some legislatures specify that the appointment
of the state official shall take place in the first instance,
while others stipulate that a corporate process agent shall be
appointed and, in case of failure to comply, direct that serv-
ice upon the state official shall be deemed service upon the
corporation. 0 8 Under the first type, the principal problems
arise over the question of whether or not the statute directs
the public official to send notice of such service to the cor-
poration itself. 0 9 If the statute contains a provision for such
notice, then the only question is whether or not such provi-
sion is reasonable. 110 If, however, the statute contains no
such provision, its constitutionality under the "due process"
clause is questionable."' Some courts have upheld service
Penna. Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 25 S. Ct. 483,
49 L. Ed. 810 (1905); Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 124 F.
259 (1903); Moore & Falk v. Freemen's Nat. Bank, 92 N. C. 590 (1884); Plott v.
Michael, 214 N. C. 665, 200 S.E. 429 (1939).
105 See Louis Paul Haffer, "Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations as
Defendants in the United States Supreme Court," 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 639 (1937).
106 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Weeks, 254 F. 513 (1918) cert. den. 249 U. S. 602,
39 S. Ct. 259, 63 L. Ed. 797 (1919). In Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co.,
121 F. (2d) 112 at 116 (1941), the court said: ". . . a nonresident corporation which
enters into an arrangement with another corporation to operate in its name and
under its formulae is doing business in the state so as to justify service of
process upon its agent .. " See also Moore v. National Hotel Management Corp.,
21 F. Supp. 177 (1937); Street & Smith Publications, Inc., v. Spikes, 120 F. (2d)
895 (1941); Moorhead v. Curtis Pub. Co., 43 F. Supp. 67 (1942).
107 The statutes are listed in Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from
Service of Process on Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935),
particularly notes 18-9.
10 See notes 98, 99 and 100 ante.
109 State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361,
53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256, 89 A. L. R. 653 (1933); Silva v. Crombie & Co., 39
N. M. 240, 44 P. (2d) 719 (1935). See also Goodrich, op. cit. 166 et seq.
110 Rottschaefer, op. cit. 856 et seq.
11 See, for example, Gouner v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 123 La. 964.
49 So, 657 at 658 (1909), where the court said: "This law makes no provision
whatever for the service on the defendant. The officer may decline to communicate
with the person sued and give no notice whatever; not even by mail. A judgment
might be obtained without the least knowledge of the person sued. Under the
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in such cases where the corporation has expressly con-
sented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court, 112 while
others have held such service constitutional in the event the
actual custom of the state official was to forward notice to
the corporation." 3 Statutes of the second type provide that,
upon the failure of the corporation to designate a corporate
process agent, service may then be had upon a state officer.
The position of the non-complying corporation is not favor-
able thereunder, since such corporation may be estopped to
deny that the public official was authorized to receive process
on its behalf. Under such circumstances, the essentials re-
quired to assure compliance with the constitutional guaranty
of due process may not be as stringently construed."4 Deci-
sions made in this connection are dependent not only upon
the wording of the statutes but also upon the prior construc-
tion thereof by the courts of the state, and are invariably
conditioned upon the state of facts involved in the particular
action being litigated.
Among the factors of greatest consequence is the status
of the foreign corporation in the state of suit at the moment
when the purported service occurs. The weight of authority
is that the prior dissolution of a corporation or its with-
drawal from the state, executed in some other manner, will
not, ipso facto, immunize the corporation from actions
brought against it in the state from which it has so with-
drawn." 5 Many legislatures have, however, enacted stat-
phrasing of the statute, the duty of the officer begins and ends in his office. If
such a judgment were rendered, it could receive no recognition whatever at the
place of the domicil."
112 See note 109 ante.
113 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 at 27, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 at 453
(1928), Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated: ". . . the objection is not lack of
jurisdiction, but denial of due process because the statute did not require the
secretary to notify the non-resident defendant. Notice was in fact given. And it
was admitted at the bar that the defendant had, at all times, actual knowledge and
the opportunity to defend. The cases cited by the court as holding that he could
deliberately disregard that notice and opportunity and yet insist upon a defect
in the statute as drawn, although he was in no way prejudiced thereby, seems
hardly reconcilable with a long line of authorities."
114 Fry v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 226 F. 893 (1915); Lipe v. Carolina C. &
0. R. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S.E. 101, 30 A. L. R. 242 (1923); Rarden v. R. D.
Baker Co., 279 Mich. 145, 271 N.W. 712 (1937); Pinney v. Providence Loan &
Invest. Co., 106 Wis. 396, 82 N.W. 308, 50 L. R. A. 577 (1900). See also annotations
in 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1117, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 561, and 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 492.
115 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236.
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utes specifying the length of time after withdrawal during
which the corporation may be sued. 16 Even in the absence
of statute, courts have exercised jurisdiction over suits in-
volving foreign corporations no longer doing business with-
in the territorial boundaries of the state. n Here, again,
51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59
L. Ed. 492 (1915); Chipman v. Thos. B. Jeffrey Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64
L. Ed. 314 (1920); Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 2,57 U. S. 213,
42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201 (1921); Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121
F. (2d) 112 (1941); Maitland v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 40 F. Supp. 522 (1941); Yoder
v. Nu-Enamel Corp., -Neb.-, 300 N.W. 840 (1941); Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co. of
America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S.E. 723, 45 A.L.R. 1442 (1926). The annotator in 45
A. L. R. 1447 states: "... if a statute requires . . . that it shall- designate an
agent in the state on whom process may be served in actions against it, the
withdrawal of the corporation from the state does not revoke the authority of the
agent to receive service in an action on a liability arising in the state out of busi-
ness done by the foreign corporation therein. The application of this rule is not
affected by the form of the statute as requiring the designation of a private
agent or of a state official ... It seems to be the rule in at least two jurisdictions
(Louisiana and Montana) that where a foreign corporation has ceased to do busi-
ness within a state the revocation of the authority of its agent designated for
the service of process is effectual, although the liability of the corporation was
incurred while it was doing business in the state."
116 State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc., v. Superior Court, 289 U. S.
361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256, 89 A. L. R. 653 (1933); American Railway Exp.
Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U. S. 269, 47 S. Ct. 353, 71 L. Ed. 639 (1927); Consolidated
Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 260 P. 745 (1927); Stephens v. Richman
& Samuels, Inc., 118 F. (24) 1011 (1941). But see Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life
Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 31 S. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 686 (1910).
Maurice S. Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on
Foreign Corporations," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1935), note 84, lists the states which
have enacted statutes to the effect that the corporation shall remain subject to
suit for the duration of liability outstanding against it.
117 In Germania Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 112 Ky. 303, 65 S.W. 611, 99 Am. St. Rep.
295 (1901), the court said: "There is no provision in the law limiting this consent
to such time as the insurance company shall do business in this state. The object
and purpose of the statute . . . was to provide a mode of service to citizens who
should desire to sue upon contracts of the insurance company, rather than com-
pel them to go to the state of the corporation for redress. If this consent is to be
withdrawn as soon as the company withdraws, the provision . . . would be a
useless provision . . . We conclude, therefore . . . that it is intended that the
consent to service on the insurance commissioner is not limited to the time
when the company is soliciting business here, but extends to all business that
it may do while here. As long as a policy issued is in force, or loss thereunder
remains unsatisfied, this consent to service . . . is binding." See also Billmyer
Lumber Co. v. Merchants' Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 696, 66 S.E. 1073, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1101 (1910); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct.
707, 47 L. Ed. 987 (1903); Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. .573, 31
S. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 686 (1910); Frazier v. Steel & Tube
Co. of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S.E. 723, 45 A. L. R. 1442 (1926). But see Con-
solidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 260 P. 745 (1927); Conley v.
Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, 23 S. Ct. 728, 47 L. Ed. 1113 (1903);
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed. 517 (1895); St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882).
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the propriety of service is intimately related to the capacity
of the agent served to receive process on behalf of the for-
eign corporation."" The question turns upon the express
provisions and court interpretation of the statute, if any, or,
in the absence of statute, the reasonableness of construing
service upon the agent selected as service upon the corpor-
ation."9
The principles underlying the competency of courts to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations, and the
rather arbitrary limitations imposed by the necessity of
complying with due process requirements, have been can-
vassed and scrutinized with particular reference to state
court actions. The majority of these concepts and rules are
equally pertinent in the sphere of federal jurisdiction. Ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, however, is fur-
ther restricted by the provisions of Section 51 of the Judicial
Code. 2 '
A corporation is construed to be a "person," an "inhabi-
tant," and a "citizen" within the meaning of this section, but
for purposes of jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States, it is such for the state of its creation alone.'2 ' There-
118 See cases listed in note 115 ante.
119 Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Brackin, 140 Ga. 637, 79 S. E. 467 (1913) holding
statute which provided for leaving of process at agent's place of business uncon-
stitutional because there was no reasonable probability that defendant would
receive notice after withdrawal; Butterfield v. Miller, 195 F. 200 (1912); Gouner
v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 123 La. 964, 49 So. 657 (1909); Stephens v.
Richman & Samuels, Inc., 118 F. (2d) 1011 (1941); Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life
Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 31 S. Ct. 127, 54 L. Ed. 1155, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686 (1910);
Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 329 (1928) affirmed in 279 U. S.
405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929); State ex rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v. Dis-
trict Court, 102 Mont. 274, 57 P. (2d) 772 (1936).
120 28 U. S. C. A. § 112: ". . . no civil suit shall be brought in any district court
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district
than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only
on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be
brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant." See also Allen J. Levin, "Federal Venue in Actions Against Corporations,"
15 Temp. L. Q. 92 (1940).
121 Rose, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts (Matthew Bender &
Co., Albany, N. Y., 1922, 2d Ed.) 244, states: "A corporation is a resident or in-
habitant of the State by which it is incorporated; if that State is divided into
more than one district, it is an inhabitant of the district in which its general
business is carried on, and in which it has its headquarters and general offices.
It cannot be said to be an inhabitant of the other Federal districts, although it
may operate a line of railroad through them and maintain therein freight and
ticket offices and stations." See also Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales,
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fore a federal court action should be brought against it ex-
clusively in the district comprising the place of its incorpor-
ation, 12  excepting only when the plaintiff is a citizen of an-
other state and sues the foreign corporation on the basis of
diversity of citizenship in the district of the plaintiff's resi-
dence. 23
This section does not confer jurisdiction upon, nor place
restrictions upon the jurisdiction already vested in, the fed-
eral courts. It limits the question to one of venue and confers
upon the individual litigant the personal privilege of im-
munity from suit in any federal court other than those desig-
nated.'24 Since the protection afforded by this section of
the code is a personal privilege, it may be waived,'25 and
one of the methods of perfecting such waiver is, of course,
by voluntary appearance in the action. 12 6 Moreover, accord-
ing to the great weight of authority, a foreign corporation
effectively waives the privilege thus conferred upon it by "do-
151 U. S. 496, 14 S. Ct. 401, 38 L. Ed. 248 (1894); Seaboard Rice Mill. Co. v. Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 270 U. S. 363, 46 S. Ct. 247, 70 L. Ed. 633 (1926); St. Louis
and San Francisco R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 11 S. Ct. 982, 35 L. Ed. 659
(1891); Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 S. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402
(1895); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44, 36 L. Ed. 942
(1892). But see Sansbury v. Schwartz, 41 F. Supp. 302 at 303 (1941), where the
court stated: "It would appear from the terms of the Act in question that such
motor carriers are treated as if physically present in each of the States through
which they are licensed to operate, and, although they may not have physical
property and station agents at all times within each jurisdiction, they are, for
the purpose of answering process of the courts of such jurisdiction, legally to
be found therein and inhabitants thereof."
122 Bunn, A Brief Survey of the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the
United States (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1939, 4th Ed.) 71.
123 Rose, op. cit. 247, states: "Where jurisdiction is exclusively based on diverse
citizenship a corporation incorporated by one State may be sued in the district
of another State in which the plaintiff resides, provided service of process can
be secured upon it in the latter district; which is possible when the corporation
carries on business therein."
124 Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. Clow, 204 U. S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed.
488 (1907); St. Louis and San Francisco R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 11 S. Ct.
982, 35 L. Ed. 659 (1891).
125 Maitland v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 40 F. Supp. 522 (1941). But see also Bene-
ficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 41 F. Supp. 854 (1941), where it was held
that a defendant's waiver of proper venue which entitled him to be sued in district
of his residence does not constitute a 'waiver' by codefendant of his right to be
sued in district of his residence.
126 Simkins, op. cit. 104. But see Rose, op. cit. 246, that the objection to juris-
diction is not waived by filing a demurrer for the special and single purpose of
2bjecting to the jurisdiction nor by answering to the merits upon that demurrer
being overruled.
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ing business" in another state,2 7 though the waiver so ac-
complished is commonly held to be limited in scope to suits
by residents of the state in which it is transacting its busi-
ness.
1 28
As a general rule, in the absence of a voluntary ap-
pearance by the corporation, several conditions must con-
cur before the federal courts will exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation in a state other than that in which it
was created. Thus it must appear, as a matter of fact, that
the corporation is transacting business in the state or dis-
trict in which the suit is brought;'29 that such business is
transacted or managed by some officer or agent appointed
by and representing the corporation in the state of suit;"'
and it has even been held that it must appear that there is
in existence some local law making the foreign corporation
amenable to suits in that state as a condition of its permis-
sion to do business therein.' When there is a local statute,
the federal courts generally follow such local statute as to
the method prescribed. 13 2 However, it has been held that if
the corporation is not "doing business" in the foreign state,
legal service cannot be had even though the state law might
127 Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1878); New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 S. Ct. 364, 28 L. Ed. 379 (1884);
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898).
See also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. Ed. 167, 128 A. L. R. 1437 (1939), to effect that appointment of process agent
constitutes waiver.
128 Seaboard Rice Mill. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 270 U. S. 363, 46
S. Ct. 247, 70 L. Ed. 633 (1926); Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 S. Ct.
935, 36 L. Ed. 768 (1892); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct.
44, 36 L. Ed. 942 (1892); Mexican Central R. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 13
S. Ct. 859, 37 L. Ed. 699 (1893); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales, 151
U. S. 496, 14 S. Ct. 401, 38 L. Ed. 248 (1894); Rust v. United Waterworks Co., 70
F. 129 (1895); Hagstoz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 179 F. 569 (1910).
129 See cases listed in note 104, ante, and Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works,
190 U. S. 428, 23 S. Ct. 807, 47 L. Ed. 1122 (1903); Herndon-Carter Co. v. James
N. Norris, Son & Co., 224 U. S. 496, 32 S. Ct. 550, 56 L. Ed. 857 (1912); Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711 (1929); Richard-
son v. North American Clay Co., 41 F. Supp. 528 (1941); Bellar v. Lake Erie
Chemical Co., 41 F. Supp. 676 (1941); Carpenter v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 41 F. Supp.
710 (1941); Westor Theatres, Inc., v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757 (1941).
130 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed.
711 (1929).
131 Thompson, op. cit. V, 1556 et seq. But see also Simkins, op. cit. 105.
132 Hughes v. Johnson Educator Food Co., 14 F. Supp. 999 (1936); Hinchcliffe
Motors, Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 580 (1939).
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authorize it."3  The problem involving the requisite quan-
tum of "doing business," the sufficiency of the service made,
the adequacy of the representative capacity of the agent
served, and other like questions are decided by federal
courts in the same manner and with similar results as they
are decided by state courts.
The exploration, to this point, has covered an investiga-
tion of principles applicable to litigation involving causes of
action which accrued to the plaintiff by reason of business
transacted or damage inflicted within the state. The cases
are in conflict on the question of whether or not those same
principles apply to suits involving subject matter entirely
foreign to the state. As a general rule, whether or not the
courts will exercise jurisdiction over suits upon causes of
action not growing out of business done within the state, may
be resolved only by ascertaining the breadth of the interpre-
tation given by the courts to the state statutes, or by using
the doctrine under which the court is deemed to have jurisdic-
tion over the foreign corporation in any event, or by investi-
gating the method, statutory or otherwise, by which the
corporation may be brought within the effective operation of
such jurisdiction. 1 4
The decisions indicate a tendency to hold that if the cor-
133 Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428, 23 S. Ct. 807, 47 L. Ed. 1122
(1903); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964
(1898).
134 See cases listed in note 94 ante. Goodrich, op. cit. 174, states: "Whether the
jurisdiction extends to suits upon all causes of action or only to those growing
out of business done within the state is a question to be determined by ascer-
taining how broadly the consent given is to be interpreted. The interpretation
of the consent given is a matter for the state courts, subject to the limitation, of
course, that the interpretation be not unreasonable. In the absence of a con-
struction by the state courts, the federal courts tend to construe the consent
narrowly." In 19 Minn. L. Rev. 375 at 396 (1935) appears the statement: "We have
no clear cases deciding upon the power of a state to authorize service as to causes
of action unconnected with the business transacted within a state. The Supreme
Court (Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573, 31 S. Ct. 127, 54
L. Ed. 1155 [19101) has said that a clause in a statute continuing the authority of
the statutory agent . . .did not apply to causes of action unconnected with the
business done within the state, but it may be doubted whether the statute under
consideration was intended to cover such causes of action. In two other cases
(Chipman v. Jeffrey Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314 (1920); Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed.
201 [1921]) the Supreme Court has refused to sanction service of process as to
causes of action not arising out of the business transacted within the state, but
here too there was a clear indication that the statutes purporting to authorize
such service were not so construed."
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poration itself appoints a corporate service agent the court's
jurisdiction may extend to foreign causes of action; 3 5 but,
in the absence of such appointment, if the process is served
upon an undesignated agent of the corporation, jurisdiction
may be exercised only with respect to causes of action aris-
ing out of business done in the state.'36 Such is also the case
where the statute provides for service upon a state officer
in the absence of appointment of a corporate agent,"7
though where the corporation has appointed a public offi-
cial as statutory service agent, suits are permitted upon
foreign causes of action so long as such interpretation has
some logical basis, the corporation being bound at its peril
to abide by any rational construction placed on the
statute. 13
The scope of valid statutory service may, of course, be
enlarged, either expressly or by local judicial construction,
135 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233,
62 L. Ed. 587 (1918); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Chipman v. Thos. B. Jeffrey
Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314 (1920); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.
Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533, 42 S. Ct. 210, 66 L. Ed. 354 (1922); Smolik
v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (1915); Mass. Bond. &
Ins. Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (1930); Bagdon v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075 (1916).
136 Goodrich, op. cit. 177, states: "In the Old Wayne and Simon cases the
Supreme Court decided that a foreign corporation was liable to suit in a state
only upon causes of action arising out of the business there done. Service in
both these cases was made upon a public official of the state. In the Tauza case,
Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
held that a foreign corporation was subject to suit in New York upon a cause of
action totally independent of the business carried on there. In that case, how-
ever, service was made upon the resident agent of the corporation, and on that
the ground the Supreme Court decisions were distinguished." See also Com-
mercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782
(1909); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed.
1097 (1935); Steele v. Western Union Tele. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583, 96
A. L. R. 361 (1934).
137 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236,
51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329,
73 L. Ed. 711 (1929); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59
L. Ed. 492 (1915); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y.
432, 111 N. E. 1075 (1916); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
222 F. 148 (1915).
138 Rottschaefer, op. cit. 858. See also Guiterman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 4E
F. (2d) 851 (1931); American Indemnity Co. v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co.,
1 F. Supp. 160 (1932), affirmed in 63 F. (2d) 395 (1933); Stephens v. Richman &
Samuels, Inc., 118 F. (2d) 1011 (1941). But see Butterfield v. Miller, 195 F. 200
(1912).
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to embrace foreign causes of action in certain specified in-
stances and in the presence of particular combinations of
factual circumstances. Thus the decision of the court may
be influenced not only by the capacity and status of the
agent served, but also by such factors as whether the de-
fendant owns property within the state or district; whether
interstate commerce would be unduly burdened; whether
the court itself would be unreasonably burdened; whether
the quantum of business transacted by the defendant is
construed to be adequate to support such exercise of juris-
diction; whether the cause of action is entirely foreign or in
some way related to the business of the corporation within
the sphere of the court's potential jurisdiction; whether the
defendant is "doing business" in the state or jurisdiction at
the moment of suit, and a myriad other pertinent circum-
stances, immediate or remote in effect.
Another factor of consequence is the residence of the
plaintiff. It has been held that, in instances where such suit
is not contrary to the laws or the policy of the state of the
forum, a non-resident plaintiff may be permitted to main-
tain an action against the foreign corporation." 9 This cir-
cumstance is considered not only in connection with cases
involving foreign causes of action, 4 ° but also in those relat-
ing to the burdening of interstate commerce,' the with-
'39 Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed.
996 (1923); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170
U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
(U.S.) 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856); New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S.
591, 13 S. Ct. 444, 37 L. Ed. 292 (1893); Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24
L. Ed. 853 (1878); St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia,
203 U. S. 183, 27 S. Ct. 132, 51 L. Ed. 144 (1906). See also note in 24 Corn. L. Q.
266 (1939).
140 Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed.
996 (1923); Morris & Company v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct.
360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct.
526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Richardson v. North American Clay Co., 41 F. Supp.
528 (1941); Panstwowe Zaklady Graviozne v. Automobile Ins. Co., 36 F. (2d) 504
(1928); Lightfoot v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 33 F. (2d) 765 (1929); Lipe v. Caro-
lina C. & 0. R. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S. E. 101 (1923); Bagdon v. Philadephia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075 (1916); Reeves v. Southern
Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561, 49 S. E. 674, 70 L. R. A. 513 (1905); Hunter v. Mutual Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 184 N. Y. 136, 76 N. E. 1072 (1906); Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v.
Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936).
141 Steele v. Western Union Tele. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583 (1934); Balti-
more Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936).
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drawal of the corporation from the state prior to suit,'42 the
quantum of business required, 13 and also the competency
of jurisdiction in federal cases.' Apparently conflicting de-
cisions are rarely distinguished solely on the basis of the
residence or domicile of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, in con-
junction with other factual elements, it is frequently re-
vealed as a significant ingredient of the completed judicial
opinion. 145
The foregoing survey, though not completely compre-
hensive in scope, presents an analysis of the current status
of authority sufficiently panoramic in nature to provide a
background upon which those problems engendering the
greatest conflict may be silhouetted. The possibility of the
exercise, by both state and federal courts, of competent jur-
isdiction over foreign corporations being now firmly estab-
lished, three major inquiries develop, namely: (1) why may
such jurisdiction be exercised? (2) how may it be exercised?
and (3) when will it be exercised?
The first inquiry is resolved with ease where the state
legislature has enacted an enabling statute expressly provid-
ing that foreign corporations shall be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state courts. Here again, however, there exist
three problems. They are: (1) the inherent constitutionality
of the particular statute; (2) whether or not the courts of
other states will extend full faith and credit to decisions
reached by the courts of the forum; and (3) whether the
federal courts, sitting in those states, will follow the proce-
dure stipulated in the statute and elect to take jurisdiction
in like manner. These points having been discussed herein-
above, it is not proposed to consider them again at this time.
In the absence of statute, other bases have been em-
ployed as foundations upon which to erect the structure of
the courts' jurisdiction. These have been enumerated and
described somewhat minutely. Recapitulating briefly, they
involve:
1. Consent, either express, as by qualification to trans-
142 Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 184 N. Y. 136, 76 N. E. 1072, 20
L. R. A. (N.S.) 677 (1906).
143 See note 83 ante. 144 See notes 12.1-3 ante.
145 See cases cited in note 140 ante.
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act business in the state in accordance with the state stat-
utes, by appointment of a process agent, or otherwise; or
implied, as a consequence of some voluntary act on the part
of the corporation, such as "entering" the state and "doing
business" therein, or, more rarely, acquiring and owning
property therein, or some other overt act. Consent could be
implied because the state was imbued with the power to ex-
clude foreign corporations entirely from its borders, and
hence could impose such terms as were deemed desirable
as conditions precedent to its admission, so long as there
was no violation of those constitutional rights possessed by
corporations in their capacity as persons within the mean-
ing of the due process clauses. If, therefore, the corporation
came within the boundaries of the state, it was conceived to
have done so with knowledge of and assent to those condi-
tions. The defects of this theory were illustrated by its inap-
plicability to two situations: first, instances in which the
corporation has expressly refused to submit to the exercise
of jurisdiction over it; and second, cases involving foreign
corporations engaged in interstate commerce, which the
state had no power to exclude.
2. Presence, which permits the assumption of jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations present within the territory
over which the courts' power extends. By those same acts,
or similar ones, from which the courts had previously de-
duced a consent to be sued, the courts can now discover the
"presence" of the corporation. The two situations which the
consent theory fails to meet are thus resolved with ease; but
a new hazard confronts the court seeking to exercise juris-
diction over a foreign corporation, which has withdrawn en-
tirely from the state, a difficulty which cannot be recon-
ciled on the basis of any concept of "presence."
3. A coterie of doctrines, promulgated and used rather
sporadically and more or less locally, including the theories
of waiver, submission to conditions stipulated pursuant to
the states' police power, consideration for the privilege of
doing business within the state, propriety and convenience,
domicile, and others.
4. Doing business, the ascendant doctrine increasingly
preponderant with the growth of the industrial era, by which
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foreign corporations, transacting a sufficient quantum
of business within the sphere of the courts' potential jurisdic-
tion, thereby render themselves amenable to service of pro-
cess. Each theory has its contemporary proponents, yet
there are implicit in each not only qualities of great merit
but also characteristics incapacitating it from universal ap-
plication.
The second inquiry-how may jurisdiction be exercised
-involves the protective guaranty of the due process
clauses. A corporation, in its anthropomorphic incarnation
as the requisite type of "person," is entitled to adequate
notice prior to any judicial determination of its legal rights,
obligations, and liabilities. It is inherently impossible for
process to be served, within territorial boundaries, upon the
foreign corporation itself. Therefore some method of sub-
stituted service becomes essential. The nature of the method
employed is commonly directed by statutes which may be
implemented or amplified by judicial interpretation and
local custom. Regardless of the presence or absence of such
statutes, the composite weight of authority is that the recipi-
ent of this necessarily constructive service must be an agent
whose capacity in relation to the foreign corporation is suf-
ficiently intimate or representative to warrant the assump-
tion that process served upon such agent would, in all rea-
sonable probability, be transmitted either to the corporation
itself or to those representatives thereof who would be
charged with the responsibility for maintaining its defense.
The process agent so served may be one specifically desig-
nated by the corporation for that purpose, being either a
state official or one selected solely by virtue of his relation
to the corporation; or he may be vested by indirection with
authority to receive process, his warrant therefor being de-
rived either from the fact that he is the actual, albeit undes-
ignated, representative of the corporation within the area,
or from a statute stipulating that the current incumbent of
a particular state office shall be deemed to be such agent.
Various ramifications of this subject have been previously
indicated.
The third inquiry-when will such jurisdiction be exer-
cised-involves use of the standard of "reasonableness." Of
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such apparent consequence to the result of judicial deter-
mination is this standard, that increasing attention is being
paid to it.' 46Among those according recognition thereto is
Judge Cochran of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky, who, in 1922, incorporated into his opinion, in
the case of Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve
Bank,117 a remarkable treatise upon the subject of juris-
diction over foreign corporations. He arrived at the conclu-
sion that the existence of jurisdiction in a case of this kind
depends upon whether, in view of the ultimate facts thereof,
the existence of jurisdiction would be reasonable. He also
stated: "If its exercise would be reasonable, jurisdiction
exists. If, on the other hand, it would not, jurisdiction does
not exist."' 4 He would limit the potential bases of jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations to this one factor. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the adoption of this standard as the
actual foundation of jurisdiction and making it the criterion
for determining whether or not the court may hear and de-
cide a case, does not permit the establishment of adequate
safeguards for arriving at that determination in the first in-
stance. It is hardly competent to decide the initial jurisdic-
tional question upon the basis of the result which will ensue
after full hearing of the particular case. Furthermore, he
would identify the third major inquiry with the first. The two
are fundamentally distinct and should not be confused.
Just as the reasons for exercising jurisdiction over nat-
ural persons are varied,"9 so, also, may there be several
bases for acquiring jurisdiction over foreign corporations,
146 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602 at 617, 19 S. Ct.
308, 43 L. Ed. 569 at 574 (1899), states: "If it appear that there is a law of the
state in respect to the service of process on foreign corporations, and that the
character of the agency is such as to render it fair, reasonable, and just to imply
an authority on the part of the agent to receive service, the law will and ought
to draw such an inference and to imply such authority, and service under such
circumstances and upon an agent of that character would be sufficient." See
also Stumberg, op. cit. 86, and articles in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1931); 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 1217 (1930); 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1926); and 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 639 (1937).
147 286 F. 566 (1922). 148 286 F. 566 at 588.
149 Haffer, in 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 639 at 668 (1937), states: "The only hope for,
and indication of a changing basis of jurisdiction, where convenience and justice
may serve as a primary jural incentive for exercising jurisdiction rest strangely
enough not in cases of service on foreign corporations but in recent cases dealing
with service on individuals. The recent cases of Hess v. Pawloski, and Doherty
& Co. v. Goodman indicate this trend."
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any one of which may be valid, depending upon the factual
situations existing in each case. For example, in the case of
Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough,150 the
court refused to entertain jurisdiction on the basis that due
process had been violated because: (1) process had been
served upon a state official without the actual consent by
the corporation to be so notified; (2) there was no provision
in the statute requiring such state official to notify the cor-
poration of the litigation pending against it; and (3) the
cause of action arose outside the state of suit. Although pre-
sumably the original court could, and did, acquire jurisdic-
tion over the defendant corporation, nevertheless its deci-
sion was not granted full faith and credit because it was
construed to be a violation of defendant's constitutional
rights and "unreasonable" for the original court to exercise
its jurisdiction. Despite this, other decisions have approved
similar service on a state official,'51 have approved stat-
utes similarly silent on the question of notice, 152 and have
permitted cases involving subject matter foreign to the state
of suit.'53 In those cases there was no question of the ac-
quisition by the court of jurisdiction over the defendant. Va-
rious concepts were adopted as vesting the court with juris-
diction in the several cases. The distinction was drawn at
the point of determining whether or not to exercise the juris-
diction unequivocally possessed in the first instance. 5 4
150 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907).
151 State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S.
361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256 (1933); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps,
190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987 (1903); Cohen v. American Window Glass
Co., 41 F. Supp. 48 (1941); Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., -Neb.-, 300 N.W. 840
(1941); Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0. R. Co., 123 S.C. 515, 116 S.E. 101 (1923); Silva
v. Crombie & Co., 39 N.M. 240, 44 P. (2d) 719 (1935); Rarden v. R. D. Baker Co.,
279 Mich. 145, 271 N.W. 712 (1937).
152 State ex. rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc., v. Superior Court, 289 U. S.
361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 1256 (1933); Silva v. Crombie & Co., 39 N.M. 240, 44
P. (2d) 719 (1935); Rarden v. R. D. Baker & Co., 279 Mich. 145, 271 N.W. 712
(1937).
153 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed.
711 (1929); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917) ; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S.
100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Weeks, 254
F. 513 (1918) cert. den. 249 U. S. 602, 39 S. Ct. 259, 63 L. Ed. 797 (1919); Mass.
Bond. & Ins. Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (1930); Vilter Mfg.
Co. v. Rolaff, 110 F. (2d) 491 (1940). See also Rottschaefer, op. cit. 860.
154 Foster, in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 at 1229, states: "Once a defendant is sub-
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From this consideration of the constitutional limitations
imposed by the due process clauses as they relate to the
service of process in suits against foreign corporations it is
concluded:
(1) That the assumption of jurisdiction over such for-
eign corporations may be justified upon any one or more of
the several bases indicated, depending upon the circum-
stances present in each case. The courts are not and should
not be restricted to any one basis exclusive of all others.
(2) The foreign corporation may be brought within the
effective operation of such jurisdiction by substituted serv-
ice, in the state of suit, upon an agent, either actual or statu-
tory, provided that either the corporation has expressly con-
sented to be served in that manner, or the agent is so repre-
sentative in character that it is reasonable to assume that
notice will be communicated to the corporation. These meth-
ods are not arbitrarily exclusive, but other reasonable means
may be employed, so long as due process requirements are
not violated.
(3) That jurisdiction, once acquired, will be exercised
only when it is reasonable to do so, i. e. when it is not un-
reasonable in the sense that it is violative of due process.
There is, then, an additional line of investigation to be pur-
sued before the final determination is achieved, assuming
that the court has competent jurisdiction and that the meth-
od of serving process on the corporation was constitutional,
namely: whether or not the court should elect to exercise its
jurisdiction over the particular action then before it. It is at
this point that the question of reasonableness becomes per-
tinent and decisive.
(4) The concepts concerning the bases for acquiring
jurisdiction have increased in number and will doubtless
continue to do so. 15' The methods by which foreign corpora-
ject to suit for any purpose, the due process clause can at most exclude juris-
diction as to actions which it is manifestly unreasonable to try within the state.
This is true regardless of what theory is adopted as to the basis for jurisdiction
over foreign corporations."
155 In Hunau v. Northern Region Supply Corporation, 262 F. 181 at 182 (1920),
the court said: "The theory upon which rests the right to sue a foreign corpora-
tion is in flux, and much may depend in the end upon what view becomes
dominant."
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tions are rendered amenable to suit are numerous, as has
been demonstrated, and, on the basis of past experience,
clearly other means will arise by statutory enactment and
judicial decision. As has been said: "Due process of law,
like equity, is capable of infinite expansion. '
156 Dimock, op. cit. 183.
